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SEPARATION OF LAW AND STATE
Talia Fisher*
In the framework of the jurisprudential literature, the law-state
bond is assumed as a given. Points of dispute emerge only at more
advanced stages of the discussion, with respect to such questions as
the duty to obey state law or the appropriate extent of state inter-
vention in social relations. This Article will be devoted to a
reconsideration of the presupposition of the law-state link and to
challenging the state's status vis-A-vis the law-both in its role as the
producer of legal norms and its capacity as the arbiter of disputes.
The Article opens with a comparative elucidation of the Hobbe-
sian and Lockean justifications for the existence of the state and its
intervention in the law. The first Part of this Article analyzes the
"ills" of the State of Nature, reviewing the range of failures that ac-
company market supply of the legislative and judicial functions.
These derive from the public good characteristics of legislative and
judicial services, from the fact that law is a network industry, and
from the cartelization tendency in the legislative and judicial mar-
kets. Based on these failures in organizing social behavior in the
State of Nature, Hobbes's and Locke's theories of the social con-
tract justify the concentration of the legislative and judicial
functions in the hands of the state sovereign and grant it a mo-
nopoly over these functions.
The second Part of this Article critiques Hobbes's and Locke's
conclusions, first and foremost their disregard for the flaws of the
public model, which they support. An implicit premise of both the
Hobbesian and Lockean justifications for state law is that where the
private market fails, the state will necessarily fare better. However,
there is a cost to state intervention, and public supply of legislative
and judicial services is not without flaws. Proponents of the public
state law model must therefore further show that this model
generates more efficient results than those produced by the private
model. The second line of criticism will argue that the matter is
not resolved even if we assume that the fully privatized model is a
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less attractive option for the supply of law than the fully public al-
ternative. These two extreme alternatives do not exhaust the entire
spectrum of possibilities for the law-state connection. Rather, be-
tween these two polar ends there may be intermediate forms of
limited state intervention in the markets for legislation and adjudi-
cation. These configurations rest on the abandonment of the
dichotomy that characterizes Hobbes's and Locke's doctrines,
between a monolithic public legal order and sweeping non-
intervention in the law on the part of the state. This Article closes
by presenting a possible median point along the axis that illustrates
the possibility of correcting the failures of the legislative and judi-
cial markets in the framework of a polycentric legal regime based
on more limited state intervention in these areas. The conclusion
offered will be that while the ills of the State of Nature, as identi-
fied by Hobbes and Locke, are valid justifications of state
intervention per se in the legislative and judicial markets, they do
not justify intervention in the form of a state monopoly over the
law. State intervention in legislation and adjudication is vital for
creating the space in which legal regimes can grow-where rights
can be set and adjudication conducted in light of those rights.
There is absolutely no need, and therefore no justification, for the
state to hold the sole power to set these rights itself and decide
disputes in light thereof.
INTRODUCTION
The law and the state appear to be inextricably intertwined. The
term "law" immediately conjures up the image of the state law, the
craftwork of the legislative and judicial authorities.' The state, too,
is identified first and foremost with the functions it fills in the areas
of legislation and adjudication,' and the law is perceived as its very
heart and soul. This perception is expressed in the jurisprudential
literature, which is founded on the law-state link, in its natural pre-
sumption of the legitimacy of this relationship and the lack of any
attempt to trace the origins of the state's authority to intervene in
the law. Only at more advanced stages of the literature's discussion
1. The positivist school of thought expresses this approach most incisively in holding
that the state dimension of the law constitutes a foundational element in its definition, and
that "law" is therefore devoid of any meaning without the state. See, e.g.,JOHN AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1995) (1832); Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 44 (1942).
2. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COM-
PARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 75 (1986).
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is the law-state connection scrutinized, in the context of such issues
as the duty to obey the law, the appropriate extent of state inter-
vention in social relations, and the substance of the link between
the law and state. The very legitimacy of the state's intervention in
3law is considered a fundamental, indisputable premise.
Is this relationship, however, indeed a Gordian knot? This Arti-
cle is devoted to considering the possibility of unraveling the
existing bond between the law4 and the state. It will examine the
possibility of eliminating the status of the state as sole legislator
and arbiter, and of supplying these services instead by the free
market. Under the alternative model that will be analyzed, the au-
thority to produce legal rules and decide disputes in accordance
with those rules would be dispersed amongst the entire population,
in complete autonomy from the state and its institutions. Contract-
ing with suppliers of legislative and adjudicative services will be on
a voluntary basis. Parallel legal systems and competing dispute-
resolving bodies will coexist within one political and geographic
unit, overturning the a priori premise of one uniform law. These
private legal systems will operate in the market and will be guided
by consumer demand. It is important to stress that the paper will
not challenge the actual necessity for a legal system to order social
behavior. It fully acknowledges the need of every self-preserving
3. The literature in the area of philosophical anarchism has an ideological link to the
issue under discussion. See, e.g., CHAIM GANS, PHILOSOPHICAL ANARCHISM AND POLITICAL
DISOBEDIENCE (1992); JOSEPH RAz, The Obligation to Obey the Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 233 (1979). However, the philosophical anarchism
approach challenges only the duty to obey state law. In this sense, it relates to a far more
limited issue than the question of the very authority of the state to intervene in the law and
constitute a state law system. See A. John Simmons, Philosophical Anarchism, in FOR AND
AGAINST THE STATE 19 (John T. Sanders &Jan Narveson eds., 1996); Rolf Sartorius, Political
Authority and Political Obligation, 67 VA. L. REV. 3 (1981); Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23
HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 753 (2000).
4. "Law" in the sense of Fuller's broad definition of the term: "[T]he enterprise of
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules ...." LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY
OF LAW 124 (1964). Under this definition, it is possible to include within the scope of the
"law" also norms that are extrinsic to the state and lack the features of supreme authority
and being universally binding. SeeJAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 221 (1988). On
the other hand, this definition also implies that not only is it unnecessary for the state to be
the source of a rule or norm for it to become "law," but this feature is not, in itself, a suffi-
cient condition for creating law. In this context, see Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes &
Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L.
REv. 581 (1998). My choice of adopting Fuller's definition of law for the purpose of this
Article is motivated by practical considerations as well. This definition regards the law as an
enterprise and relates, in this sense, not only to the legal product but also to the process of
its creation: to the institutional structures involved in the creation of the law and to the array
of incentives that lead to its supply and to compliance with it. For this reason, Fuller's defini-
tion is more suited to the economic analysis that lies at the base of this Article. See BRUCE L.
BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAw:JUsTICE WITHOUT THE STATE 11-12 (1990).
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society to place police and judges at its gates, which are clear and
accepted apparatuses for setting behavioral norms and deciding
disputes (as well as enforcement bodies). Criticism will, however,
be directed at the need for specifically state law as well as at the al-
legedly organic link between the law and the state. In the described
sense, the proposed model is aimed at realizing the goal of freedom
of law as opposed to freedom from law. This issue of privatization of
the law and its detachment from the state can be viewed as the ex-
tension of an ideological continuum that begins with separation of
church and state, continues to the capitalistic call for separation of
the economy and the state, and then culminates in the revocation
of the state's status vis-A.-vis the law.
I. THE REASONS FOR A RECONSIDERATION
OF THE STATE LAW MODEL
The technological and social transformations of the modem era
have diminished the relevance of the law-state and law-territory
relationship,5 and the extent to which the state law model is suited
to the realities of our current way of life has been placed in doubt.
In this context, two seemingly opposite trends are notable, both of
which embody what can be seen as a challenge to the state law
model. The first phenomenon is globalization. The communica-
tions revolution has led to an extremely sophisticated ability to
make legal transactions that traverse territorial boundaries. The
most extreme manifestation of the globalization trend is the as-
cendancy of the Internet and the legal contracting that is executed
in cyberspace. Due to the virtual space in which the Internet oper-
ates and the ability of users to act simultaneously from any number
of points or to conceal their geographic location, the classic struc-
ture of state law, which is territory-contingent, 6 has ceased to be
exhaustive. Indeed, a body of law whose field of operation is de-
lineated according to geo-political boundaries cannot provide an
5. There is room to argue that the detachment of the law from territory is consistent
with the distinction between geographic characteristics and characteristics related to values,
on which the Aristotelian ideal of the community rests. According to Aristotle, the "state" is
not a product of geography alone; rather it is founded, additionally, on a shared value infra-
structure. The model under consideration, which cancels the territorial dimension of this
equation, thereby resolves the inevitable tension between the two dimensions. SeeJohn T.
Sanders, The State of Statelessness, in FOR AND AGAINST THE STATE 255, 257 (John T. Sanders
&Jan Narveson eds., 1996).
6. Statuta Suo Clauduntur Te rtorio.
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adequate response to the need to arrange behavior in a world in
which physical-geographic location is gradually losing meaning.7
Emerging as a parallel trend to globalization, the internal disin-
tegration of the state is a source of counter-pressure, also placing
in doubt the suitability of the state law model .
One of the most prominent features of the modern state is its
multiculturalism, 9 a product of the modern era's sophisticated mo-
bility as well as the fact that liberal democratic regimes refrain, as a
rule, from coercing cultural assimilation in a state melting pot. The
diverse human mosaic that typifies contemporary Western states
has led to the widespread phenomenon in which many sectors of
the populations fail to share a common value base. Consequently,
there is growing ideological alienation towards the state legal sys-
tem and internal sectoral consolidation.'l
This trend is reflected in the establishment of private alternative
legal systems that are tailored to the specific needs of a given
community and that distinguish it from other sectors in the state
communality." One of the most illustrative examples is the private
and autonomous legal systems operated by the ultra-orthodox Jew-
ish sector both in the State of Israel and across the world. Within
this community, there is widespread resort to private tribunals
("Batei-Di-Tzedek"-private courts of justice) to resolve disputes.
These tribunals provide a genuine alternative to the general state
system. They set behavior norms and settle disputes in the entire
range of areas, including matters with a "criminal" slant, with the
7. It is possible to view the problems that arise due to the growth of the Internet as a
sort of modern incarnation of the factors that led to the historical consolidation of the "Law
Merchant"-namely, the minimization of the territorial dimension of the transactions, the
prevalence of one-shot transactions, and the need for speedy and unequivocal decision mak-
ing. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Aron Mefford, Note, Lex Informatica: Foundations of Law on the
Internet, 5 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 214 (1997).
8. For a broader review of the challenge to the status of the state law system, see Rex
R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, TheEnd of Law, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1 (2004).
9. See CHRISTOPHER W. MORRIS, AN ESSAY ON THE MODERN STATE 79 (1998); Erik
Luna, Race, Crime, and Institutional Design, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183, 191 (2003);John
Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 233, 234
(1989).
10. See JEROLO S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 69 (1983); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 5, 29 (1996).
11. See Hanina Ben-Menahem, Jewish Law and the Constitutional Regime in the State of Is-
rael: Halakha, the State, and the Community Model, in THE QUEST FOR HALAKHA:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON JEWISH LAW 461, 473 (Amichai Berholz ed., 2003)
(Hebrew).
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aim of preventing community members from turning to the state
courts .
There is an abundance of similar examples of communities that
operate closed and internal legal systems, such as the Gypsy com-
munity,13 the diamond industry community," and the farming
community in Shasta County, California," all of which settle
community disputes according to a private normative code
completely separate and unrelated to any agency of state power.
From a slightly different angle, the phenomenon of privateS• 16
communities is also a prominent manifestation of social
fragmentation processes and the desire to increase the extent of
control wielded by the community while narrowing the central
government's power. 7 On the background of these processes of
globalization, on the one hand, and the social unraveling within
the state's boundaries, on the other, there is growing concern that
the state model is standing in the way of more suitable models for
ordering social behavior. This makes a reassessment of the state law
model imperative.
12. Shlomo Daichovsky, The Rabbinical Court as Arbitrator, 16/17 SHNATON HAMISHPAT
HAIVRI [YEARBOOK OFJEWISH LAW] 527 (1991); Shlomo Daichovsky, A Critique of Rabbinical
Court Decisions, 13/14 DINt ISR.: AN ANNU. OF JEWISH L.: PAST & PRESENT 7 (1988) (He-
brew).
13. Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of
the "Gypsies", 103 YALE L.J. 323, 325 (1993).
14. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
15. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
16. See FRED FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES: THE MARKET
PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES (1994); EVAN McKENzIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSO-
CIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994); ROBERT G.
NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS (1989); Donald J. Boudreaux & Ran-
dall G. Holcombe, Government by Contract, 17 PUB. FIN. Q. 264 (1989).
17. A parallel trend of legislative decentralization is emerging also on the federal
plane, manifested in the transfer of legislative powers to the states. For a discussion of the
narrowing of the federal legislator's power and the increasing power of the state legislators,
see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics ofJurisdictional Competition:
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 CEO. L.J. 201 (1997). There is a clear ideo-
logical link between the decentralization of legislation in the federal context and the
cancellation of the state's monopoly in law, with the central overlapping point rooted in
inter-jurisdictional competition. The ideological basis to this is, amongst other things, Tie-
bout's classic model of the supply of local public goods. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). Yet despite their similarities, there is a clear
distinction to be made between the matter of decentralization of legislation in the federal
context and the proposed model for privatizing law: under the federal structure, a legal
monopoly is still preserved in any given geographical jurisdiction (even if smaller in scope),
whereas the model proposed in this Article rejects the notion of monopolistic law in a given
territorial expanse.
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II. THE FRAMEWORK OF DISCUSSION
The current legal theory framework lacks, as mentioned, a fun-
damental discussion of the question of the source of the state's
authority to intervene in the law. This vacuum can be explained as
deriving from the premise that the institution of state law is justi-
fied based on the very justification of the state's existence. In other
words, that the economic-philosophical-moral justification for the
existence of the state gives rise in itself to the justification for state
intervention in legislation and adjudication. Thus, in considering
the legitimacy of state intervention in the law, the central grounds
justifying the state must be examined. Once these justifications
have been formulated, it will be possible to isolate and contend
with the components that relate to state intervention in legislation
and adjudication.
The purpose of this discussion will be to critique the commonly
accepted justifications for the existence of the state and its inter-
vention in the law, on the assumption that undermining the
foundations of the approaches that represent the mainstream justi-
fication for the state (and, derivatively, its intervention in the law)
will tip the balance in favor of detaching the state-law bond.
Hence, the discussion will be devoted to challenging the justifica-
tions for the state formulated by Hobbes and Locke, the
theoretical pioneers of the social contract theory and the fathers of
Anglo-American political philosophy.
A. The Hobbesian Justification for State Intervention in the Law
Hobbes (1588-1679) linked the constitution of a state system
with the very ability of human society to prevail and exist in
peace.18 He painted a grim and miserable picture of the pre-
political condition. Chapter XIII of his book Leviathan 9 presents a
hypothetical state, commonly known as the "State of Nature,
20
which is characterized by a lack of a sovereign authority21 and
where the legislative and judicial (and enforcement) functions are
in private hands. The first layer of Hobbes's doctrine is the notion
18. JOHN T. SANDERS, THE ETHICAL ARGUMENT AGAINST GOVERNMENT 13 (1980).
19 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 183 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651).
20. The term "the State of Nature" is not taken from Leviathan, but is rather the com-
monly accepted term used to describe this condition. See id. at 40.
21. Id.
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of a constant threat of "war of all against all, 2  in this hypothetical
state of nature. This war has harsh outcomes, which lead to social
chaos and languish. Human beings, as rational creatures, will come
to understand that the solution to the state of nature lies in the
pursuit of peace,3 but at the same time, it will be clear to them that
a one-sided laying-down of arms would amount to a death sentence
(for them) . Consequently, under the hypothetical scenario, hu-
man beings will choose to exit the state of nature by entering into a
social contract, which unifies them under a shared sovereignty. In
the framework of this social contract, rational individuals will agree
to mutually forego their natural rights to protect their lives by pri-
vate means. These natural liberties will be transferred to the
sovereign, who will, in exchange, provide them with protection and
social order. Thus, according to Hobbes, the state is justified in
that it is an entity to which rational individuals would have hypo-
thetically covenanted to subject themselves, as a solution to the ills
of the state of nature.25 As explained, this Article scrutinizes the
justification for state intervention in law, not the general justifica-
tion for constituting the state. Hobbes explicitly addressed this
aspect and defined the sovereign's role in this context as follows:
"He isJudge of what is necessary for Peace; andJudge of Doctrines:
He is Sole Legislator; and supreme Judge of Controversies."
2 6
If this is the case, then the set of claims presented thus far holds
the essence of the Hobbesian justification for state intervention in
the legislative and judicial functions and the constitution of mono-
centric state law. Due to the lack of alternative means for
successfully imposing peace and social order, rational individuals
will be driven to subordinate themselves to the rule of the sover-
eign and thereby submit to the monolithic set of rules and the
monocentric apparatus for dispute resolution that the sovereign
sets. For without a state and without monocentric public legislative
and judicial mechanisms, social peace will be impossible to achieve
and society will be drawn into a never-ending war of all against all.
From this hypothetical social contract, Hobbes derives the legiti-
macy of the state, state law, and the state judicial system.
22. See David B. Suits, On Hobbes's Argument for Government, 4 REASON PAPERS 1, 2
(1978).
23. "The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundarnentall Law of Na-
ture; which is, to seek Peace, and follow it." HOBBES, supra note 19, at 190.
24. SANDERS, supra note 18, at 23.
25. It should be stressed that Hobbes does not pin his hopes on an actual social con-
tract in practice, but rather relies on an acceptance in principle of the obligations that arise
from an ideological covenant of this sort. See C.B. MacPherson, Introduction to HOBBES, supra
note 19, at 9, 45.
26. HOBBES, supra note 19, at 252.
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B. The LockeanJustification for State Intervention in the Law
One of the most prominent social contract theories following
Hobbes was formulated by the English scholar John Locke (1623-
1704) in his Two Treatises of Government. 7 According to Locke, the
state of nature, despite its pre-political condition, is not character-
282
ized by a legal vacuum . s Rather, the law of nature reigns, and
human beings deduce this law by human reason.29 The Lockean
state of nature represents a sort of utopia-a morally ideal state
that all human creatures occupy. 5 In the framework of this state,
human beings enjoy full liberty and equality, in the sense that they
are both free of one another and equal to one another.
3' It is im-
portant to stress that this liberty relates to freedom from being
harnessed by the Other, to a freedom in social and political rela-
32 33tions,3 but not to a freedom from the fetters of the law of nature.
According to Locke, under the law of nature, every individual is
entrusted with the right to preserve the human race.34 As a conse-
quence of this inherent right to protect the well-being of the
human race, each and every person is permitted to act as an "en-
forcer" of the law of nature, 35 both individually and through
cooperation with others.6
In light of the existence of the law of nature and the effective
ability to execute it, Locke rejected the Hobbesian presumption
that the state of nature will inevitably drag human society into a
war of all against all. In one of the sole paragraphs in the Two Trea-
tises of Government with subtle reference to the Hobbesian
argument, Locke stated:
27. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690).
28. BARRY MACLEOD-CULLINANE, THE RIGHT TO REVOLUTION: TOLERATION, LIBERTY
AND THE STATE IN THE THOUGHT OFJOHN LOCKE AND THE EARLY LIBERALS (1994).
29. "[T] he Law of Nature ... is the Law of Reason ... ."JOHN LOCKE, The First Treatise,
in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 27, 1 101; see also MACLEOD-CULLINANE,
supra note 28.
30. See David B. Suits, On Locke's Argument for Government, 1J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 195,
195 (1977).
31. Peter Laslett, Introduction to LOCKE, supra note 27.
32. MACLEOD-CULLINANE, supra note 28.
33. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 27,
6.
34. Id. 8.
35. SANDERS, supra note 18, at 30.
36. Locke maintained that the authority to constitute a central government is a meta-
morphosis of the natural right to unite for the purpose of executing the law of nature. It can
be understood from his theory that this right resides alongside the natural right to self-
preservation and preservation of the human race. See Laslett, supra note 31.
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And here we have the plain difference between the State of
Nature, and the State of War, which however some Men have
confounded, are as far distant, as a State of Peace, Good Will,
Mutual Assistance, and Preservation, and a State of Enmity,
Malice, Violence, and Mutual Destruction are from one an-
other.
This notwithstanding, Locke asserted that human beings will none-
theless prefer to forfeit their "perfect liberty" in favor of
constituting a Commonwealth community and submitting them-
selves to sovereign rule.38 This will be due to the difficulties in
administering justice 9 in the state of nature, which destabilize the
social order in that state. In situations of non-legitimate uses of
force, disputes and wars are likely to erupt.40 And once they have
begun, they are likely to persist for a long time 41 due to the lack of
a neutral greater entity to resolve the discord, and due to the ten-
dency of human beings to tilt the law in their favor-to treat more
severely those who have harmed them and with greater lenience
their own injuries to others.42 Thus a vicious cycle emerges of viola-
tion of the law of nature, exaggerated responses to injury,
exaggerated responses to exaggerated responses, and on and on.40
Locke reviewed these difficulties entailed in the administration of
justice in the state of nature, the first being the legislative failure.
According to Locke, despite the existence of the law of nature,
as a practical matter, a shortage of legislation is likely to emerge in
the state of nature, due, amongst other things, to biases and fail-
ures inherent to the application of the law of nature in concrete
circumstances. Locke asserted that, in the state of nature:
First, There wants an establish'd, settled, known Law, received
and allowed by common consent to be the Standard of Right
and Wrong, and the common measure to decide all Contro-
37. LOCKE, supra note 33, 19 (emphasis omitted).
38. Id.
39. See SANDERS, supra note 18, at 36.
40. Despite the difficulties identified by Locke as likely to lead to the emergence of
violent disputes and the outbreak of wars in the state of nature, his conception is not consis-
tent with the Hobbesian state of nature (or the scenario of a war of all against all).
According to Locke, while war becomes a more probable likelihood in the state of nature, it
does not describe or define that state. See Laslett, supra note 31, at 99.
41. LOCKE, supra note 33, 120.
42. "[It is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their own Cases ... Self-love will
make Men partial to themselves and their Friends. And on the other side ... Ill Nature,
Passion and Revenge will carry them too far in punishing others." Id. 13; see also Suits,
supra note 30, at 196.
43. Id.
444 [VOL. 43:2
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versies between them. For though the Law of Nature be plain
and intelligible to all rational Creatures; yet Men being biased
by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are
not apt to allow of it as a Law binding to them in the applica-
tion of it to their particular Cases.44
The second flaw in the state of nature, identified by Locke, is the
judicial failure. This relates to the absence of a neutral institutional
third party to which disputes can be directed for resolution in
situations of conflicts of interest.
Secondly, In the State of Nature there wants a known and indif-
ferent Judge, with Authority to determine all differences
according to the established Law. For every one in that state
being both Judge and Executioner of the Law of Nature, Men
being partial to themselves, Passion and Revenge is very apt to
carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own
Cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make
them too remiss, in other Mens.5
The third and final failure is essentially of an enforcement type
and is therefore less relevant to the issue under discussion. This
failure relates to the absence of an institutional enforcement body
in the state of nature for executing judicial decisions. 4 According
to Locke, the problems entailed in administering justice in the
state of nature will eventually undermine the overall social order,47
and it is at this point that the Lockean doctrine proceeds to the
issue of exit from this state. As in the Hobbesian doctrine, Locke's
theory presents the social contract as the key to exiting the state of
481nature. In the framework of the social contract, the parties cove-
nant to relinquish their natural rights for the purpose of forming a
political authority to constitute the state and establish monocentric
public systems of legislation, adjudication, and enforcement. The
political authority to govern and arrange social behavior consti-
tutes, in this sense, a metamorphosis of the natural rights of all
human beings to implement the law of nature and preserve the
44. LOCKE, supra note 33, 124.
45. Id. 125.
46. Id. 126.
47. Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and
the Needfor a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1810 (1986).
48. Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Book Review, Epstein's Takings Doctrine and the Public-Goods
Problem, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1233, 1235 (1987) (reviewing RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)).
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human race. 9 The Lockean justification for forming the state and
for its intervention in the law stems from either express or tacit
consent of the individuals comprising society to subjugate them-
selves to the state's rule and to its functional institutions-the
public legislative, judicial, and enforcement apparatuses.
In sum, despite the differential starting-points of the two think-
ers and despite the fundamental divergences between the
Hobbesian social contract and the Lockean variation,0  the two
doctrines are aimed at a basically identical conclusion: exit from
the state of nature is based on entering into a social contract with
the purpose of constituting the state and establishing monocentric
public legislative and adjudicatory (as well as enforcement51) insti-
tutions.
The conclusions formulated by Hobbes and Locke with regard
to the imperativeness of the state and the legitimacy of its interven-
tion in the law were extensively adopted. For hundreds of years, to
this very day, there has been sweeping acceptance of their funda-
mental assertion that state intervention in the law, by establishing
state legislative and judicial systems, is indeed justified.
49. Laslett clarifies the following point: in accordance with the Lockean doctrine, the
political authority is based on the metamorphosis of human beings' natural lights in rela-
tion to others, and thus, the sovereign government should not be understood as derived
from the right to self-rule. Laslett, supra note 31, at 111.
50. The differences between Hobbes's concept of the social contract and Locke's ap-
proach are apparent in the framework of such issues as their respective views of the state of
nature, the law of nature, human reason, and the nature of man, as well of the purposes and
characteristics of the legitimate state. Locke sketches a softer human nature than that de-
scribed by Hobbes, as well as painting a far more optimistic picture of the state of nature. In
addition, Hobbes sees human reason as a means of extracting man from the state of nature,
whereas Locke sees man's rational ability as a means of imposing order within the state of
nature. Their concepts of consent also diverge. Locke places greater stress than Hobbes on
the element of consent, even though he also extends its application beyond explicit consent.
In contrast, in Hobbes's doctrine, consent is ascribed far less overall weight. Hobbes re-
ferred to hypothetical and abstract consent and grounded the justification for the state
primarily on teleological foundations. An additional difference is rooted in the outcomes of
the social contract. Under Hobbes, the social contract cannot be revoked and he grants the
sovereign absolute power. The Lockean social contract, in contrast, is revocable and leads to
limited government. In this sense, it can be claimed that Locke conceived of a more democ-
ratic regime. See also Williamson M. Evers, Social Contract: A Critique, 1 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD.
185, 189 (1977).
51. The enforcement element has been intentionally understated as it is irrelevant to
the framework of the discussion, as explained at the outset of this Article.
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C. An Analysis of the Components of the Hobbesian
and LockeanJustifications
Two forms of justification are integrated in Hobbes's and
Locke's theories. On the one hand, these justifications rest on a
teleological foundation, insofar as they refer to the purposes and
aims the state is intended to realize. Both the Lockean and Hobbe-
sian doctrines regard the state as a social instrument for realizing
specific goals (first and foremost, the establishment of public legis-
lative, judicial, and enforcement systems 2) and rest on the premise
that the state is morally justified because it is necessary for realizing
these same goals and purposes. On the other hand, Hobbes and
Locke grounded their theories also on a constitutive foundation:
under both, the state is justified also because of the way in which it
is constituted. Thus the state derives its moral legitimacy not only
from the purposes it strives to realize, but also from its formation53 1
process (by way of a social contract) .5
52. SANDERS, supra note 18.
53. It is true that certain reciprocity exists between the teleological and constitutive
components. There are grounds to claim that the way in which a social institution is created
will impact its substance and purposes. And vice versa-that the goals that the institution will
pursue will influence the social willingness to constitute it. Thus, in the present context, it
can be asserted that the willingness to enter into a social contract stems from the teleologi-
cal component and the presumption that the state will aid in achieving goals that cannot be
realized in its absence, such as preventing a war of all against all. The opposite can also be
stated: it can be argued that a state that is created by means of a social contract can be ex-
pected to pursue an agenda that correlates with the objectives at the base of the teleological
component. In either case, presumably, there is a direct link between the two spheres. How-
ever, a possible alternative conception is that the two layers can in fact be placed at odds.
The criticism in this context is that the social contract doctrine suffers from an internal logic
contradiction. On the one hand, in order for the teleological component to stand, we must
accept the presupposition that human beings will not be willing to cooperate enough in the
state of nature for the purpose of maintaining social order. On the other hand, accepting
this premise necessarily and inherently entails the negation of any possibility of relying on
cooperation for entering into the social contract, on which the constitutive component is
based. In other words, if the state is imperative, it is not attainable, and if it is attainable, it is
not imperative. The reliance on a social contract for forming the state, on the one hand,
and the claim that it is not possible to constitute an effective array of contractual rights in
the absence of a state, on the other, amounts, in this context, to a contradiction. See DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORAL DEALING: CONTRACT, ETHICS, AND REASON (1990); JEAN HAMPTON,
HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION (1986); Tyler Cowen & Gregory Kavka, The
Public Goods Rationale for Government and the Circularity Problem, 2 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 265
(2003); Hummel, supra note 48, at 1242; Joseph P. Kalt, Public Goods and the Theory of Gov-
ernment, I CATOJ. 565 (1981).
54. It can be claimed that the constitutive component bears lower overall weight in
Hobbes's theory than in the Lockean doctrine and vice versa with regard to the teleological
element.
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This Article will be devoted to attacking the teleological founda-
tions of the two doctrines.55 In this framework, I will seek to show
that the arguments at the base of these doctrines for constituting a
state legal regime are valid and forceful with regard to the need for
organized, accepted, and neutral legislative and judicial systems.
However, they do not sufficiently justify their complete encompass-
ment under the state umbrella. It is generally possible to take both a
positive and negative tack against the teleological foundation. A
negative attack challenges the extent to which the state law and the
state judicial system can indeed achieve their set goals-that is, such
an attack would attempt to show that the state is incapable, both
conceptually and concretely, of realizing the goals of providing ef-
fective and neutral legislative and judicial systems of the quality
and to the extent that enable effective imposition of social order. A
positive line of criticism, on the other hand, would attempt to
demonstrate that these goals can be realized through private
means as well. This Article will seek to formulate a positive attack
on the teleological component. 6 I will attempt to show that legal
orders and effective social ordering can be supplied without any
recourse to the existing format of state intervention in the law.
55. It is possible to attack the constitutive component in Hobbes's doctrine in a num-
ber of aspects. It can be argued that hypothetical consent does not give rise to contractual
liability and the fact that rational individuals will tend to agree to some sort of social con-
tract does not bind someone who is not party to the contract in question. See Jonathan
Wolff, Anarchism and Skepticism, in FOR AND AGAINST THE STATE, supra note 3, at 99, 104;
Jonathan Wolff, Hobbes and the Motivations of Social Contract Theory, 2 INT'LJ. PHIL. STUD. 271
(1994).
The constitutive element of Locke's theory also was the target of sharp criticism, with
central focus on the different forms of implicit consent. In this context it can be argued that
tacit consent does not have sufficient force to serve as an indication of agreement, in cases
in which the possibility of exit is most significantly limited. See Jan Clifford Lester, Market-
Anarchy, Liberty and Pluralism, in FOR AND AGAINST THE STATE, supra note 3, at 63; John
Dunn, Consent in the Political Theory ofJohn Locke, 10 HIST.J. 153 (1967); lain W. Hampsher-
Monk, Tacit Concept of Consent in Locke's Two Treatises of Government: A Note on Citizens,
Travellers, and Patriarchalism, 40 J. HIST. IDEAS 135 (1979); A. John Simmons, Tacit Consent
and Political Obligation, 5 PHIL & PUB. A . 275 (1976).
56. An alternative way of interpreting the social contract doctrines, particularly the
Lockean version, is that for the teleological objective to be achieved, it is necessary to
ensure the establishment of systems that will realize ethical-moral objectives that are derived
from the law of nature. In light of such interpretation of the teleological element, it is not
sufficient to prove that a private legal order can exist in order to collapse the Lockeanjusti-
fication for state law, and the question of the normative desirability of private legal orders
must be contended with as well. This alternative interpretation of the teleological element
will be discussed in the framework of a separate paper.
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D. The Structure of the Article
The discussion will proceed in the following manner. Part A will
be devoted to a preliminary outline of the completely private al-
ternative to the state law model, sketching competitive markets for
law in which the means of production involved in supplying legisla-
tive and adjudicative services are all privately owned, with the state
completely excluded from these functions. On the background of
the description of this hypothetical world, I will explain its inher-
ent problems. Namely, I will identify the market failures that arise
in the framework of a completely private supply of legislative and
judicial services, which presumably mandate state intervention in
the law. Part B of this Article will, accordingly, undertake a thor-
ough and systematic review of the range of market failures that are
likely to emerge in the described private markets for legislation
and adjudication. The discussion will be constructed on a clear dis-
tinction between market failures that derive from externalities in
the legislative and judicial markets and those failures that stem
from the cartelization tendency in the market for law. In the
framework of considering failures originating in externalities, I will
discuss public goods in the market for law and the network charac-
teristics of the law industry. The discussion on the law market's
cartelization tendency will focus on elucidating the claim that, in
the long-run, privatization of the market for law will lead to the
establishment of an extremely small number of giant suppliers of
law, which will be able to abuse their status. After surveying the
range of failures that are likely to emerge in the market for law, I
will proceed to the final stage of this Article, where I will argue that
a monocentric state law is not necessary for overcoming these mar-
ket failures and that a different, narrower format of state
intervention would suffice. I will claim that the existence of market
failures, although likely to justify a certain extent of state interven-
tion in the markets for legislation and adjudication, do not justify a
state monopoly over these services. Part C of this Article will con-
clude by outlining an alternative model for providing legislative
and judicial services that, on the one hand, is not based on total
privatization of the law market and, on the other, loosens the link
between the law and the state, in comparison to the Hobbesian
and Lockean models of state law.
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PART A: A PRIVATE MARKET FOR LAW
With the state law model such an integral part of our surround-
ings, it is difficult to even conceive of a world in which the state has
no foothold in the law. The discussion that follows will therefore be
devoted to a most preliminary outline of a fully competitive market
for law, with private ownership of all the means of production en-
tailed in supplying legislative and judicial services. At this stage, I
will disregard market failures that could arise in a market for law
and will assume the existence of a system of competitive legal mar-
kets, where entrepreneurship in supplying legal services is
completely compensated by the consumer public, aided by ac-
cepted copyright mechanisms. A detailed clarification of the
market failures involved in private supply will follow in ensuing
parts. The scenarios described below are by nature speculative, for
there is a fundamental impediment to predicting where initiatives
in the legal field will lead.57 Moreover, the very consideration of
such enterprises or attempt to foresee precisely the way in which a
private market for law will unfold would emerge as a doubled-
edged sword for the privatization model, for a most compelling
argument in favor of centralization could be made were we to pos-
sess the rational ability to amass and process the thousands upon
thousands of extensive pieces of information required to depict
exactly how the competitive market is expected to operate.58 Ac-
cordingly, no pretense will be made here of providing a full and
hermetic response to the question of how private markets for legis-
lation and adjudication will function. The discussion will have a
more modest aim, namely, concretization of the concept of "priva-
tization of legislation and adjudication" and providing a general
57. Part of the problem is the concern that there will be a certain allegiance to the ex-
isting model and adherence to a state "mindset." In this respect, the attempt to examine
how legal systems that fundamentally resemble the state system can be supplied in a free
market is likely to emerge as redundant. Privatizing the law and altering the public dimen-
sion of the legal systems may lead to a complete transformation of their general character. It
is possible that in the private framework, there will be greater reliance on dispute-resolution
mechanisms (such as mediation procedures), rather than dispute-determination mecha-
nisms (such as arbitration). It is also possible that the nature of the dispute-deciding
procedures will diverge from the accepted format; one of any number of complex and crea-
tive solutions may be, for example, greater reliance on referees than on judges. In light of
the limited ability to disconnect from what already exists and estimate how the change to the
public dimension of such a dynamic system as the legal system is likely to impact its other
aspects, I will limit my analysis to the dispute-deciding mechanisms that imitate the public
judicial system. An additional reason to focus specifically on private judicial mechanisms,
which resemble in substance the state judicial system, stems from the challenge it entails: it
is specifically these mechanisms that can be expected to be more problematic to supply in a
competitive market.
58. SeeJohn Hasnas, The Myth of the Rule of Law, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 199, 228.
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idea as to the ramifications of transforming the state law model
into a "privatized" legal system.
One keystone in constructing a conception of a competitive
market for law is the empiric experience that has amassed with re-
gard to private legislative and judicial systems, such as the
customary legal system in the Shasta County farming community in
California 59 and the merchant groups in the diamond
° and cotton 61
industries. There are a number of central motifs common to all of
them: the establishment of standard and accepted procedures for
determining disputes, evolutionary processes of customary law,
recognition of individual rights while placing emphasis on prop-
erty rights, a prominent tort dimension and the predominance of
monetary remedies, social sanctions such as boycotting and ostra-
cization, and victim responsibility for execution of the law,
supported and assisted by institutional reciprocal arrangements.
This empiric evidence is likely to shed some light on the possible
evolution of the law within the structure of a competitive market.
One probable (albeit not necessary) prospect is that some of these
fundamental features will exist in legal systems that arise with the
privatization of the market for law.
The private model for the supply of legislative and judicial ser-
vices rests on an array of competing legal orders that, as a
conglomerate, order social behavior-that is, a polycentric set of
"legal communities" that coexist within one geopolitical unit. I will
first consider the privatization of the legislative function. In a com-
petitive market for legislation, each legal community will be able to
institute a separate and unique legislative order. Some of the legis-
lative agencies might prohibit abortions while others may not;
some may make writing a constitutive requirement for contracts,
whereas others may suffice with a verbal contract in all areas. Some
law agencies may offer all-inclusive legal regimes, while others may
restrict themselves to more specific and narrow spheres of social
ordering.
Legislative services will be consumed similarly to how other eco-
nomic goods and services (such as entertainment, health, clothing,
and footwear) are currently consumed. Every individual will have
the ability to choose the legal system that suits his or her prefer-
ences and a maximal degree of control in choosing the legal basket
to which he or she will be subject. The ability to provide distinct
59. ELLICKSON, supra note 15, at 1315.
60. Bernstein, supra note 14.
61. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. Rv. 1724 (2001).
62. BENSON, supra note 4, at 21.
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legal products will mean that the needs of many sub-markets can
be responded to simultaneously. In this context, it is important to
recall that human beings are complex and multi-dimensional crea-
tures. They may have conservative tendencies with regard to
certain aspects of ordering human behavior (for example, with re-
gard to euthanasia), yet at the same time be liberal with regard to
other aspects (for example, with regard to abortion). Under the
63state law structure, there is little room for maneuvering. In con-
trast, under the private model, it will be possible to unpack the
various social ordering dimensions in light of which people will be
able to order their behavior. They will have the option of assem-
bling a legal basket that more precisely reflects all components of
their personalities and of creating the closest representation of
their vast array of preferences. They will be able to consume some
of the legislative services of an agent with a liberal inclination,
while ordering another part of their behavior and legal relations by
way of a conservative agent.
Like their discrete contents, the normative origins of the legal
regimes that will prevail in a competitive legal market for law can
also be expected to be diversified, deriving from customary, prece-
dential, or contractual foundations. A rough distinction can be
drawn in this context between the two models of a private law mar-
ket likely to arise as alternatives to state law. The one model, the
decentralist model, would rest on an array of spontaneous custom-
ary law systems; that is, on private legal orders that gradually
emerge and evolve, whose development is not a product of con-
scious design, and that have innumerable untraceable sources. The
second model would be the polycentric model, founded on legal
regimes whose creation is initiated by private, perhaps even for-
profit, legislative bodies. This private law would be the product of
63. Moreover, under the state model, a move from one legal system to another (from
state to state) entails heavy costs. See David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in SOCIAL CON-
TRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU 147, 156-59 (Ernest Baker ed., 2d ed.
1960).
64. It should be noted that, from the perspective of terminology, the distinction I draw
between the concepts "polycentric legal structure" and "decentralist structure" does not
reflect the use of these terms by other authors. This terminological division is not even con-
sistent with the original intention of Polanyi, the scholar who apparently coined the term
"polycentric." In using the term "polycentric," Polanyi was in fact seeking to describe a spon-
taneous and uninitiated social order. See MICHAEL POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY:
REFLECTIONS AND REJOINDERS 170 (1951). The term "polycentric" was "imported" into the
jurisprudence discourse by Hayek, who also was referring to a spontaneous and uninitiated
legal order. See RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF
Law 257 n.1 (1998); F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 160 (1960). In addition,
there are scholars who make use of the terminology "polycentric system" with regard to both
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a planned and institutional initiative, entering the world only after
undergoing an orderly development procedure and with traceable
65sources.
The lion's share of the literature on non-state private law has fo-
cused thus far on spontaneous customary law. Many view it as "the"
natural alternative to state law.66 This Article, however, will attempt
to illuminate the alternative of a polycentric legal system that is
based on private legislative and judicial bodies that operate for
profit in a competitive market. This choice stems, first and fore-
most, from the fact that the needs of modern society (like the
technological means available to it) make the complex alternative
of an instituted legislative enterprise, in the framework of the pri-
vate sector, into a more probable option. Admittedly, it is difficult
to predict where privatization of the legal system will lead and it
should be assumed that two types of law-customary law and law
created by a planned legislative initiative-will be present in the
conglomerate of the private market for law; however, in the mod-
ern era, the particular weight of the institutionalized private
alternative can be expected to be greater. The focus on the poly-
centric model derives also from research considerations, from the
desire to shed some light on an angle of private law that has yet to
enjoy any thorough consideration in the literature. This notwith-
standing, since there is great similarity between the models and
both alternatives deal with a multiplicity of competing sources of
law and the supply of legislative services in the private sector, the
discussion of the polycentric model can be drawn on for insight
into the customary alternative.
The network of relations that will emerge between the private
suppliers of law in a polycentric legal market will essentially resem-
ble the relations amongst states acting in the international arena.
Choice of law rules will be established to arrange "border-crossing"
interactions between individuals belonging to different legal agen-
cies. Law agencies will function both as "manufacturers" of legal
rules and as the mediators of social covenants.
The privatization process will also impact the material contents
of the legislative products. In this context, it can be expected that
emphasis will shift from the political-public dimension of the law to
the private dimension. The sharpest transformation can be
customary law and private law that is the product of a planned initiative. See, e.g., Lester,
supra note 55, at 63, 71.
65. See ELLICKSON, supra note 15; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
66. See, e.g., ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WEL-
FARE (1986).
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expected on the "criminal law" plane, a sphere that is nourished by
the state-law link. In the framework of a private market for law,
criminal law can be expected to be absorbed into tort law; the
state's status in criminal procedure will be eliminated 67 and the
"criminal offense" will be treated essentially like an intentional tort
against the victim, 6 with a focus on compensating the victim. 69 An-
other probable outcome of the shift in emphasis to the private
dimension is the reduced probability of any normative arrange-
ment covering "victimless crimes," such as gambling or soft drug
use. 70 In the framework of a private market for law, restriction of
individual freedom of action will be limited, in all probability, only
to behaviors involving an identified victim.
Similar to the market for legislation, abolishing state interven-
tion in the market for adjudication and dispute determination will
lead to the emergence of a polycentric regime of competing sup-
pliers ofjudicial services that operate alongside one another within
one geopolitical unit. In a competitive adjudicatory market, it will
be possible to offer different models of judicial procedures. Cer-
tain judicial bodies will likely place greater emphasis on legal
certainty or strict formalistic rules in the judicial procedure; other
private tribunals might focus on the aspect of speediness or boast
procedural flexibility. We can expect tribunals seeking to deter-
mine disputes, as well as judicial bodies seeking consensual
resolutions. Certain judicial bodies are likely to specialize in nar-
row areas of dispute and to offer professional services to a defined
clientele, while some agencies will appeal to a broader public, of-
feringjudicial services in a whole spectrum of areas and disputes.
In the conditions of a competitive judicial market, fairness and
neutrality of private judges will be ensured by an internal control
mechanism founded on the completely voluntary nature of the
appeal to the private tribunals. A private court that conducts itself
in a prejudiced fashion will not survive over time. Once it acquires
a dubious reputation, it will fail to win the confidence of potential
litigators. External entities will refrain from entering into legal re-
lations with the agency's customers for fear of being subject to its
biased adjudication, and consequently, disputes involving external
67. MuRRAY R. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY 85 (1982).
68. BENSON, supra note 4, at 351.
69. Despite the fact that damages will almost certainly be the central remedy in a poly-
centric legal structure, there is nothing in principle to prevent other remedies. For example,
Benson points to the fact that under customary legal systems, such as that which prevailed in
Ancient Iceland, offenders in particularly severe cases were even sentenced to death. For
more details, see id. at 356.
70. Id. at 351.
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parties will not be brought before the agency. It will be relegated to
disputes involving only its own customers as parties; moreover, if it
emerges as systematically prejudiced against one particular side in
such disputes as well, the consistently biased sector of its customers
will also become alienated. The volume of disputes brought to the
agency for determination will slowly shrink, and it will eventually
go out of business.
An inevitable question relating to the functioning of a private
judicial market is how disputes will be settled between customers of
different legal agencies applying discrete legal regimes. This is
most pertinent in the context of random disputes that arise in the
absence of any pre-dispute relationship between the parties, as in
the case of a car accident between two strangers. Presumably, the
solutions provided by the market for such arbitrary disputes will
rest on the involvement of third parties in the network of relations
between the parties to the dispute: on each party's ongoing rela-
tions with third parties and on the reciprocal relations between
those third parties. Thus, for example, any individual in the market
can belong to any one of the legislative and judicial service-
providers, which concurrently serve as a sort of insurance company
for that individual in instances in which he or she has acted in ac-
cordance with the agency's criteria but has, nonetheless, become
embroiled in a dispute. The individuals in the market will be in-
duced to belong to legal agencies, for otherwise people will refrain
from engaging in legal relations with them. An additional incen-
tive, as mentioned, will derive from people's ability to collect
directly from an agency in cases of behavior that conforms to the
agency's legal rules. Of course, functionally, it will be possible to
substitute the legal agencies with actual insurance companies or
credit companies, which operate on a similar system of incentives;
when a dispute arises, each party will apply to his or her agency.
Due to the ongoing network of relations that are highly likely to
develop amongst these agencies-which will be small in amount
relative to the size of the general population-they will bear the
characteristics of repeat players and, as such, will have incentives to
cooperate with one another. Any agency that acquires a negative
reputation for impeding and undermining the dispute-resolution
processes will likely be ostracized by the competing agencies. The
ramifications will be borne by its customers, for customers of other
agencies will refrain from contracting with them. The customers of
the ostracized agency will then be compelled to switch to accepted
71. David Osterfeld, Anarchism and the Public Goods Issue: Law, Courts, and the Police, 9 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 47, 57 (1989).
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agencies that are recognized by their competitors.12 Due to the on-
going network of relations, in the majority of cases the agencies
will arrange amongst themselves the way in which disputes between
their customers will be determined and the applicable choice of
law rules, in either a pre-dispute (ex-ante) contractual agreement or
a post-dispute (ex-post) contractual agreement. A more prominent
option in a long list of possible solutions would be to refer the dis-
pute to be determined by a third, neutral agency. On many levels,
there will be great resemblance to the currently prevailing practice
in the framework of disputes in the private international sphere. 3
This preliminary outline describes competitive markets for legis-
lation and adjudication. There is room, however, to dispute its
underlying premise, that privatization would indeed lead to a
competitive market for law. At this juncture, I will proceed to a dis-
cussion of the market failures that are likely to arise in private
markets for legislation and adjudication, which can be divided into
two principal types. The first category of market failures stems
72. Support for the prediction regarding the settlement of disputes between law agen-
cies by peaceful means can be found in the clear predisposition of insurance companies to
settle disputes amongst themselves outside the courtroom. Empirical evidence shows that an
extremely high rate of disputes between insurance companies are settled outside of the
court room. See David Friedman, Anarchy and Efficient Law, in FOR AND AGAINST THE STATE,
supra note 3, at 235. Of course, there is room to maintain that the comparison is problem-
atic, for peaceful resolution amongst insurance companies is the result of the existence of a
functioning legal system in whose shadow such negotiations are conducted. This point will
be further discussed in following parts of this Article, relating to market failures in the mar-
ket for law.
73. The minimization of the failures inherent to random interaction through reliance
on reputation ties and third-party feedback is not a novel phenomenon. There are many
examples of this practice throughout history, in which the investment in reputation served
as a guarantee against defection, including in multilateral contexts. Already in the eleventh
and twelfth centuries, merchant groups would map out potential partners, who many times
lived on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, relying on information received through
an exchange of letters. In the present era, technological developments have led to a signifi-
cantly sophisticated ability to amass and disseminate information. This has considerably
increased the ability to make use of reputation mechanisms to neutralize the problematic
incentives that accompany one-shot interactions. The most prominent application of the
improved technology for storing and spreading information and for reputation-building has
arisen in the framework of the Internet. Its virtual trading forums serve as the foundations
for constructing effective apparatuses for gathering and dispensing information regarding
third-parties' previous contractual activity, as in the case of eBay.com, Yahoo.com, Halfcom,
Cnet.com, and Amazon.com. Modern technology, especially in the communications field,
has turned the entire world into a "global village." It has redefined and given new meaning
to the term "community" and has enabled the significant expansion of the term to apply in
an almost unlimited fashion. This is due to the fact that the dizzying technological develop-
ments of the last generations have been used to overcome geographic gaps. In the past,
these gaps were obstacles to efficient distribution of information and chances of reciprocal
interactions. Today, modern technology enables us to easily skip over these hurdles, facilitat-
ing mutual monitoring and flow of information---even in the framework of the largest, most
heterogenic, and dispersed of societies.
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from the existence of externalities in the markets for legislation
and adjudication and relates to the "public good" and "network
industry" features of law. The second category of market failures is
related to the cartelization tendency in the private market for law.
PART B: MARKET FAILURES IN THE MARKET FOR LAW
I. EXTERNALITIES
A. Public Goods
During the almost two centuries since Adam Smith formulated
his free market economy theory, categories of exceptions have
been defined in which economic efficiency cannot be achieved by
the market forces alone-the most prominent exception being the
public good.74 As is well known, a pure public good is distinguished
by two critical characteristics: non-rivalry and in-excludability. The
first feature relates to the fact that its consumption by one con-
sumer does not detract from the ability of others to consume it. A
public good can simultaneously appear in the utility functions of
numerous individuals. 75 The second characteristic touches on the
inability (or unfeasibility from an economic perspective) to allo-
cate property rights in this good and to prevent it from being
consumed by someone who did not participate in its funding.76 The
central problem with the supply of a public good in the framework
of a competitive market stems, of course, from the free-rider phe-
nomenon. Since it is not possible to allocate to each individual in
the market the ability to consume the public good in correlation
with his or her investment, a rational utility maximizer will prefer
not to voluntarily participate in supplying the good. And when
there is a free-riding response from a mass of individuals in the
market regarding the public good, a market failure arises. Despite
being vital for the common welfare, the attempt to supply the good
74. The focus on the study of the public good first began with the publication of Paul
Samuelson's research work, which became the canon of classic economic theory. This field
developed rapidly, and today public economics is a central school in the study of economics.
See Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REv. ECON.
& STAT. 350 (1955); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON.
& STAT. 387 (1954).
75. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40 (2d ed. 1997).
76. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
639 (4th ed. 1988).
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in a competitive market will fail,77 with the probable outcome that
either the good will not be supplied at all on the private market or
else, in a milder variation of the market failure, there will be sub-
optimal supply. 8 State intervention, of course, enables this free-
riding based failure to be overcome. As a rule, the need for state
intervention in the supply of public goods is strongest with regard
to first-order public goods-those public goods that are regarded
as an indispensable condition for the very existence of an eco-
nomic market, and are vital for obtaining other public goods
(second-order goods). 79 This understanding emerges also from
Hobbes's doctrine discussed earlier:80 as demonstrated, according
to Hobbes, the elements that comprise a social regime (legislative,
judicial, and enforcement systems) feature the characteristics of
such first-order public goods and, in any case, cannot be supplied
adequately in a free-market framework.8' I will now turn to discuss
the qualities that distinguish the law as a public good both with re-
gard to the judicial function and to the legislative function
(including judicial lawmaking).
1. The Public Good Aspects of Adjudication
The judicial function bears prominent private features, 2 in that
the determination of a dispute generates private utility for both
parties to the dispute. 3 However, alongside this private utility are
also public utilities to adjudication of the dispute: the very consti-
tution of a system for peacefully resolving disputes in society 4 and
85the very appeal to that system have characteristics of public goods.
77. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 35 (1971).
78. See Mark Bagnoli & Michael McKee, Voluntary Contribution Games: Efficient Private
Provision of Public Goods, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 351, 352 (1991); Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames,
Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, 15 J. PUB.
ECON. 295, 296 (1981).
79. See MORRIS, supra note 9, at 59.
80. MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 1 (1987).
81. Howard H. Harriott, Games, Anarchy, and the Nonnecessity of the State, in FOR AND
AGAINST THE STATE, supra note 3, at 119.
82. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 235 (1979).
83. Id. at 240. It is important to distinguish, in this context, between determining the
dispute and creating judicial precedent.
84. See Alschuler, supra note 47, at 1813.
85. Anthony de Jasay, SelfContradictory Contractarianism, in FOR AND AGAINST THE
STATE, supra note 3, at 137, 150; David Luban, Essay, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public
Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622-26 (1995); Lawrence B. Solum, Alternative Court Structures in
the Future of the California Judiciary: 2020 Vision, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2121, 2172 (1993).
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When two parties consume private judicial services in order to re-
solve the dispute between them by peaceful means, the fruits of the
peace that prevails between them are reaped also by third parties.
86
Resolving disputes without resort to force fosters social peace and
stability. The dispute-determining function promotes social peace
not only in ending the enmity between the two parties to the actual
dispute, but also, in a broader fashion, by creating a general deter-
rence effect.8 7 Bringing rights-violators to justice actually deters
potential injurers from acting similarly,88 the outcome being a gen-
eral prevention of harms and disputes. Other public goods
associated with the judicial procedure emanate from its expressive
function: the judicial verdict is likely to serve as a means of convey-
ing a message of moral condemnation 89 as well as caution to the
public 0-° for example, warning against someone who has been
convicted of a sexual offence.
The concern that arises is that under a competitive legal market
structure, potential litigators will not internalize in their utility
function this range of social utilities, which are embodied in the
very bringing of a suit and the bringing to justice of someone who
has violated their rights. Due to the free-riding tendency, each in-
dividual in the market will rely on others to supply peace,
deterrence, or information and will not be willing to bear the costs
of supplying these "public" components of the judicial procedure.
The outcome will be sub-optimal consumption ofjudicial proceed-
ings for determining disputes and sub-optimal supply of the public
goods that accompany the judicial function-peace, deterrence,
and information.'
The failure to internalize the social utility generated by the judi-
cial procedure is also likely to be manifested in the remedy sought
by private litigators who opt for judicial proceedings against some-
one who violated their rights due, for example, to the private utility
they can expect to reap. To illustrate, take a dispute over intentional
86. Morriss, supra note 4, at 582.
87. For an extensive discussion of the enforcement counterpart to this phenomenon,
see EPsTEIN, supra note 48, at 5; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines,
9J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980).
88. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 66; Alschuler, supra note 47, at 1813.
89. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. Rev. 413, 419 (1999);
Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 85, 137 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REv. 2021 (1996).
90. See Samuel Bray, Comment, Not Proven: Introducing a Third Verdict, 72 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1299, 1308 (2005).
91. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Mark Geistfeld, The Divergence Between Social and Private In-
centives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 483, 483 (1987).
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bodily harm that arises in the framework of a competitive market
for law. When the victim, rather than the state, conducts proceed-
ings against the injurer, she may weigh only her own narrow private
utility from the judicial procedure, with the remedy she seeks re-
lated only to realizing that utility. The public interest in placing the
offender behind bars, for example, for the purpose of preventing
prospective criminality will not be represented in the victim's set of
considerations.92 The victim is likely to give preference to a high
damages award over imprisonment.
Alongside the non-internalization of the positive externalities in
the area of deterrence and prevention, a parallel problem of nega-
tive externalities and shifting undesirable behavior to third parties
is also likely to arise within the structure of a competitive market
for dispute determination. For example, the resolution in the
framework of a private determination of a dispute between A and B
over environmental pollution might actually include a component
of shifting pollution to the external parties C and D, who are not
represented in the proceedings. In other words, state intervention
in the market for dispute determination is vital, it may be claimed,
not only due to the under-supply of public goods entailed by the
judicial function, but also due to the non-internalization of nega-
tive externalities-and the fear of causing public bads.
2. The Public Good Aspects of Legislation
(including judicial lawmaking)
The legal rule is considered a classic public good . The alloca-
tion of contract and property rights constitutes an imperative
condition for the framework of human existence 96 and the
92. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1201 (1985). At the same time, of course, the judicial procedure encompasses private utility
in the sense of diverting future crime away from the victim.
93. See Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law
Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1195 n.41 (1994). Here, the discussion is
conducted in the framework of a slightly different context: the privatization of protection
against crime and the attendant externalities. This notwithstanding, the analogy is clear. See
also Luban, supra note 85, at 2626.
94. See Friedman, supra note 72, at 235, 244-45; David Luban, The Quality ofJustice, 66
DENV. U. L. REv. 381,404 (1989).
95. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 23 (1974); JAMES M. Bu-
CHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY 108 (1975); RODNEY H. MABRY ET AL., NAT'L INST. L.
ENFORCEMENT & GRIM. JUST., AN ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION OF STATE AND LOCALJUDICIARY
SERVICES 78 (1977); Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc. PHIL. &
POL'Y 102 (1986); Landes & Posner, supra note 82, at 235.
96. JOHN HOsPERS, LIBERTARIANISM: A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FOR TOMORROw 425
(1971).
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functioning of an economic market.97 The legal rule is vital for
guiding social behavior;9s it enables individuals to plan their steps
in a timely fashion,99 to make an informed assessment as to how
others can be expected to conduct themselves, and to negotiate in
the shadow of the law.'09 The law lowers transaction costs in the
economy,'1 assists in the ex-ante prevention of disputes, and in their
ex-post resolution. In addition to guiding social behavior, the legis-
lative procedure and legal product serve expressive and
educational roles.10 2 The law acts as an arena for elucidating social
values and for elevating certain perceptions of justice from
amongst alternative views, 10 while the legislative procedure is a
platform for democratic deliberation. 1
0 4
Law features the defining characteristic of non-rivalry: from the
moment a body of legislation is enacted, an unlimited number of
individuals can make use of that legal corpus and derive from it the
entire diversity of attendant utilities. The marginal cost of supply-
ing the legal rule to an additional consumer is zero. 15 The
"consumption" of any legal rule by one individual does not detract
from the ability of other individuals to consume it simultaneously;
the fact that a certain individual shapes his or her behavior in
accordance with a legal rule does not detract, in itself, from the
ability of others to act similarly.0 6 The quality of in-excludability is
also present in the law. The very belonging to the relevant social
framework enables one to derive utility from the existence of the
legal corpus that applies in that framework. 1°7 It is not possible togrant copyright in a legal rule or to prevent someone without
97. JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 351 (1998).
98. See Linda A. Schwartzstein, An Austrian Economic View of Legal Process, 55 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1049, 1068 (1994).
99. JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW
AND POLITICS 355 (1994).
100. The originators of the term "bargaining in the shadow of the law" are Mnookin
and Kornhausert, in their article Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
101. Gordon Tullock, The Logic of the Law, in Anthony T. Kronman & Richard A. Pos-
ner, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAw 22 (1979).
102. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation
of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1382 (1994); Steven D. Smith, Reductionism in Legal
Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 68, 71 (1991).
103. See, e.g., Edward F. McClennen, Moral Rules as Public Goods, 9 Bus. ETHICS Q. 103,
104 (1999).
104. Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of Deliberative Democ-
racy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 321, 323 (1994).
105. John R. Haring & Kathleen B. Levitz, The Law and Economics of Federalism in Tele-
communications, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 261, 285 n.43 (1989).
106. Solum, supra note 85, at 2176.
107. MABRY ET AL., supra note 95, at 80; Morriss, supra note 4, at 581.
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property rights in that rule to act in accordance with its prescrip-
tions.' 8 Moreover, in-excludability manifests in the legal rule in
both its aspects: not only is there no practical way of withholding
the fruits of legislation from someone who did not participate in
supplying it, but the economic feasibility of so doing is doubtful.'0 9
The power of the legal rule is anchored in its collective applica-
tion. Ability to unilaterally cease to be subject to the legal rule is
not desirable, and any attempt to limit the consumption of the le-
gal rule solely to those who have participated in its funding would
be directly at odds with its very essence as a tool for guiding social
behavior."0 Due to its nature as a public good, the law will be sup-
plied below the social optimum within the structure of a
competitive market. Thus, for example, as a product of the in-
excludability of legal rights and the lack of an effective mechanism
for granting copyright in them, entrepreneurs in the legislative
field who bear the costs of producing the law will not be able to
reap the entire utility entailed by the legislative enterprise."' From
the moment that it sees the light of day, the legal rule they have
articulated will become accessible to all of society, without any pos-
sibility of instituting an effective mechanism to compensate
entrepreneurs for the development process. In light of this, indi-
viduals in a competitive legislation market will refrain from
allocating enough resources to the development of the law and will
be incentivized to free-ride on the lawmaking efforts of others."2
108. But cf William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976). The purpose of the model presented in the
framework of this article was to examine the extent of optimal investment in "production" of
legal precedents as well as to examine the desirable pace of investment in them, as a func-
tion of the capital invested, the rate of depreciation, and the relevance of the interaction
between these factors. In the margins of this model, the authors related to a certain alloca-
tion of "copyright" in the legal precedent, but the proposal that they put forth in this
context is problematic and leaves many irresolvable vacuums.
109. MABRY ET AL., supra note 95, at 80.
110. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE BASES FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1971).
111. The flawed incentive for legislative initiative is likely to be exacerbated in private
markets in which the supply of legislative services is intertwined with the supply ofjudicial
services. Landes and Posner maintain that in a competitive market for adjudication, the
exposure of the rules at the foundation of the judicial verdict is likely to guide potential
litigators with regard to the line the particular private judge will take in similar cases in the
future, thereby deterring (at least one of the sides) from litigating before thatjudge. Due to
the need to attract future customers, judges in the private sector are likely, therefore, to
refrain from judicial lawmaking and to instead wrap a cloak of ambiguity around the norma-
tive considerations that guide them in their decisions. See Landes & Posner, supra note 82, at
239-40.
112. See Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L.
REv. 181, 217 (1996). The problematic nature of initiatives in the framework of a competi-
tive market for legislation also arises in the federal context:
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Optimal development of the law will be possible, consequently,
only based on non-market motivations and incentives, which exist
in the framework of the public system. " '
Alongside the non-internalization of the positive social utility,
there is concern also regarding negative externalities that arise in
the market for legislation: the legal rule that is formulated between
A and B might generate negative externalities for a third party and
divert undesirable behaviors to him. As shown above in the discus-
sion of the judicial function, and in the legislative context as well,
there is difficulty ensuring the internalization of these negative ex-
ternalities without government intervention."
4
Due to the public characteristics of the law, the market may fail
to ensure its optimal supply, despite the fact that it is vital for or-
dering social behavior and for the general welfare." 5 This is the
foundation of the justification for state intervention in the markets
for legislation and adjudication. Further validation of the need for
state intervention stems from the very nature of these services. The
very existence of the economic market is contingent on the alloca-
tion of contractual and property rights;"6 since these rights
constitute a precondition for the formation of an economic mar-
ket, the entire conceptualization of market supply of these legal
rights can be challenged. 7 That is to say, if the law must precede
the market in order for the market to exist, the law cannot origi-
nate from the market itself. The public nature of the legislative and
judicial systems and the functional dependence on them for the
existence of an economic market necessitate, therefore, the supply
of these services by mechanisms that are external to the market
Essentially, the risks of innovative laws are borne asymmetrically: the benefits of suc-
cessful legal innovations are shared with non-innovating, free-riding states, whereas
the consequences of failed innovation (sunk research and development costs, migra-
tion of constituents out of the jurisdiction, and diminished reputation and goodwill)
are shouldered by the innovating state alone.
Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market, 36
McGILL L.J. 130, 149 (1991).
113. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law,
56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 395, 436 (1999).
114. See generally ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (Transaction Pub-
lishers 2002) (1952).
115. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 10 (2d ed.
1996); Edward J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The Efficiency of
Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REv. 701, 706 (1978); Osterfeld, supra note 71, at 48.
116. Language and currency are additional public goods that can be deemed precondi-
tions to the existence of the market. See ScoTr, supra note 97, at 351.
117. DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976).
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(i.e., the state)." 8 For this reason, the spiritual forefathers of the
capitalist school of thought posited that the legal system must be
supplied by the state. Even those same economists who waved the
banner of laissez-faire (led by Adam Smith"9) at the same time
stood firm in their stance that the state must intervene in the sup-
ply of law and adjudication.'
2
1
B. Law as a Network Industry
Beyond the public goods that are entailed by the law industry,
unique market failures arise, which are related to its network char-
acteristics. The term "network industry" refers to the wide range of
industries and goods for which there are demand-side benefits to
scale. 12 ' The utility that each consumer derives from consuming a
network good positively correlates with the number of additional
consumers of the good (and in some instances also the extent of
their overall consumption).' The demand for a network good is a
function both of the price of the good and the size of the network.
As a rough generalization, network industries can be categorized as
those industries whose goal is to serve as a platform for interaction
between consumers and that feature characteristics that enable
their consumers to share information, electronic signals, and stan-
dards.123 A good illustration is the telephone network: the owner of
the sole telephone in the world can derive zero utility from it. In
the absence of other consumers of the telephone, he has no ability
to make effective use of his instrument for communicating with
others. The more common and prevailing telephones become, the
greater the utility each telephone owner can derive from his in-
118. Osterfeld, supra note 71, at 48.
119. 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1963) (1776).
120. RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 3 (2d ed. 1996); Landes & Posner, supra note 82, at 235.
121. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects and Externalities, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Mi-
chael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93
(1994); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility, 75
AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985); William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian View, 7 CEO.
MASON L. REv. 577, 579 (1999).
122. An additional parameter might be the identity of the consumers. See David A.
Balto, Networks and Exclusivity: Antitrust Analysis to Promote Network Competition, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 523, 524 (1999).
123. Howard H. Chang et al., Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy Towards
Joint Ventures, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 223, 236.
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strument.124 This positive correlation between the economic value
of the good and the number of its consumers (and their overall
consumption) characterizes, in addition to technological and elec-
tromagnetic communications networks, also amorphous
communications networks, such as language and the law. Thus, in
order to derive utility from the acquisition of a language or from
subjection to a legal system, there must be parallel use by others.
The very constitution of the law as a tool for guiding social behav-
ior and deciding disputes is contingent on this. For without a
critical mass of individuals who are willing to submit to accepted
codes of behavior and dispute-determination mechanisms, it is not
possible to order social behavior by way of these rules and mecha-
nisms.15 The greater the scope of the legal network and its number
of members, the more far-reaching the potential legal interactions
between those members will be.12" Accordingly, the law, by nature,
is based on network effects and constitutes a network industry.27
The competition between networks features characteristics that
differ in substance from the competition that evolves between
standard goods. These characteristics raise two types of difficulties
in supplying the network goods within the structure of a decentral-
ized market. The first problem touches on under-standardization
or over-divergence in law. 28 Each consumer who joins the network
increases the utility derived by the rest of the individuals consum-
ing the network good or service, in that he expands its effective
size. His actual consumption generates positive utility for the other
consumers of the network. This social utility, however, is extrinsic
124. Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. Rev.
1257, 1281 (1998).
125. Thus, for example, the incentive for investing the resources involved in writing a
literary work will typically exist only if the lion's share of the public submits to the legal rule
that grants the author intellectual property protection for his work. Recognition of the
copyrights of authors by only a small part of the population will usually be of negligible
significance. Of course, "critical mass" has differential size, and must be considered on a
case-by-case basis. In certain contractual contexts, it is sufficient that only two individuals
agree to a common set of standards; in other contexts, the threshold will be far higher nu-
merically. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978)
(discussing "critical mass").
126. Clayton P. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usages for International Sales, 39 VA.J.
INT'L L. 707, 723 (1999); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. Rev.
813, 833 (1998).
127. One example of this is traffic laws: the greater the proportion of drivers who sub-
ject themselves to the accepted signal of the "red light" and its ensuing outcomes, the
greater the utility derived from its application and its actual use. See Avery Katz, Taking Pri-
vate Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1745, 1750 (1996).
128. See Pierre Regibeau, Defending the Concept of Network Externalities: A Discussion of Lei-
bowitz and Margolis, 17 RES. IN L. & EcoN. 33, 35 (1995).
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to his own utility function. The ensuing outcome is likely to be
the establishment of legal networks whose scope is sub-optimal.
The second concern relates to legal lock-in and over conver-
gence in law: the network gets locked into a sub-optimal standard.
The claim is that in a decentralized market structure, even if the
market forces lead to the application of uniform standards, there is
still a danger of inefficient standards being set or standards becom-
ing inefficient over time. Thus, in the legal market, there is likely
to be a negative incentive for the private legal bodies to detach
themselves from the dominant legal standard, even if in favor of a
preferable legal standard, since unilateral detachment means for-
feiting the utility derived from belonging to the existing legal
network. The private utility embodied in belonging to the network
creates, therefore, a negative incentive for legislative initiative, with
the concern being that in a decentralized legal market we will wit-
ness the collective application of inefficient legal rules. The next
Part of the discussion will be devoted to clarifying each of these
phenomena.
130
1. The Problem of Under-Standardization
Privatizing the legal system paves way for the emergence of a
multitude of legal systems within a given geopolitical unit, and the
accelerated development of differential legal rules.3 3 The number
of legal systems that will evolve under a private law model might
well exceed the number of law agencies, for each agency can sup-
129. Philip H. Dybvig & Chester S. Spatt, Adoption Externalities as Public Goods, 20J. PUB.
ECON. 231, 231 (1983).
130. At a further point in the discussion, I expand on the potential ramifications of the
network structure for the danger of cartelization in a private market for law.
131. Cover's theory expresses the view that private law systems create "too much law," to
the point where inconsistency and instability in guiding social behavior result. Robert M.
Cover, Foreword, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 41 (1983). According to Cover,
the role of the state law system is not to produce legal norms, but rather to sift out and
choose one dominant norm from the abundance of private norms that comprise the "no-
mos." In this respect, he echoes the notion that in the absence of state intervention,
standardization cannot be achieved in the norm market and the application of a uniform
law is possible only with the invalidation of competing norms and erection of one of them as
the prevailing legal rule. He states:
It is remarkable that in myth and history the origin of and justification for a court is
rarely understood to be the need for law. Rather, it is understood to be the need to
suppress law, to choose between two or more laws, to impose upon laws a hierarchy.
It is the multiplicity of laws, the fecundity of the jurisgenerative principle, that creates
the problem to which the court and the state are the solution.
Id. at 40.
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ply any number of parallel normative frameworks. The potential
for diversification is even broader in light of the fact that individu-
als will be able to consume a number of legal systems
simultaneously; that is, they will be able to order their relations
with their neighbors under law regime A, their relations with their
work colleagues under B, their behavior vis-A-vis other drivers on
the road according to the standards of legal system C, and so on
and so forth. In principle, due to the ability (of the individual con-
sumer) to consume a number of normative systems concurrently
and the ability (of each individual supplier) to supply an unlimited
number of legal systems, there is vast potential for normative diver-
sity in the framework of the polycentric legal structure.1 3 3 But
hovering at the doorstep is the danger of legal cacophony: an
overabundance of incompatible legal systems and networks, to the
point where the substance of the law is likely to be stripped of con-
tent as an instrument for guiding social behavior. Here lies the
basis for the need for government intervention. 1 4 Moreover, in a
private law regime comprised of a great number of small law net-
works, the different law suppliers are likely to be incentivized to
legislate laws with negative external effects for the members of
competing networks.13- As a result of the regulatory diversity and
on the background of the potential for a vast amount of parallel
law networks, their ability to cooperate in preventing the described
diversionary effect is severely hampered.1
36
This depiction can, however, be softened somewhat by qualifying
the ramifications of the described market failure in two important
respects. First, the private utility entailed in belonging to a network
must be taken into account. This utility precludes the materializa-
tion of the extreme scenario of infinite fragmentation of the state
law into tiny law networks upon privatization of the law. Second, it
is necessary to consider things on the background of the state
model: state law, by nature, is tainted with a parallel failure. Due to
its link to territorial-state boundaries and the notion of legal mono-
lithism in a given state unit, the state law suffers from over-
standardization in some cases and under-standardization in others.
It can be claimed that it is in fact the network features of the law
132. Friedman, supra note 72, at 235.
133. Hasnas, supra note 58, at 229.
134. For an expanded discussion on the sub-optimal standardization phenomenon in
network industries, see Jeffrey Church & Neil Gandal, Network Effects, Software Provision and
Standardization, 40J. INDUS. ECON. 85 (1992).
135. Nim Razook, Uniform Private Laws, National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform
State Laws Signaling and Federal Preemption, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 41, 46 n.20 (2000).
136. Note, To Form a More Perfect Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102
HIRV. L. REv. 842,844-46 (1989).
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that serve to justify, even partially, instituting a polycentric legal
order. 3 7 1 will relate in brief to each of these points.
In light of the network features characterizing the law industry,
private law suppliers can increase the utility their customers derive
from consuming their law services by coordinating with competing
law suppliers. Such coordination would enable the consumers of
the individual law supplier to enjoy the benefits of scale, as though
the consumers of competing suppliers are clients of their own sup-
plier. The private utility garnered from belonging to a dominant
legal network creates an inherent incentive for law suppliers to
provide network-conforming legal rules-with shared basic fea-
tures-and for the clients to consume those rules. Moreover, since
the network structure creates mutual dependence amongst com-
peting legislative and judicial service-suppliers, the sanction of
ejection from the network (due to cooperation evasion) is a most
effective dangling sword. For indeed, attempting to supply network
services or goods outside the network fundamentally alters their
nature and quality.
3 9
Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that even in the absence
of any central governmental planning, the network effects will cre-
ate an incentive for standardization, at least in all that regards the
hard core of the law: namely, those dimensions of human behavior
ordering that are vital for imposing minimal social order, such as
rules against murder, assault, rape, and theft.' 40 The normative
fragmentation amongst the different law entities, if it occurs, can
be expected to relate to the more marginal derivatives of social be-
havior ordering, such as euthanasia or abortion. This resembles
the current divergences amongst different state legal systems.
Standardization will be attainable also through a splitting of the
applicability of legal orders into inter- and intra-agency contexts;
with such division, the law suppliers will be able to offer their tar-
get clientele a high degree of conformity with competing law
suppliers and, at the same time, unique services and specific legal
rules that respond to the distinct needs within agency borders. 141
Support for the assessment that the market forces will lead to
the adoption and application of an essentially standardized norma-
137. See BENSON, supra note 4, at 300.
138. For a parallel discussion on the telephonic field, see Balto, supra note 122, at 524.
139. See Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, Networks, Law, and the Paradox of Coopera-
tion, 16 REv. AUSTRIAN EcoN. 309 (2003); Tyler Cowen, Law as a Public Good: The Economics of
Anarchy, 8 ECON. & PHIL. 249, 259 (1992).
140. BENSON, supra note 4, at 352.
141. An analogous example of the split between internal interactions and external in-
teractions can be found also in private credit institutions and the banking world. See Edward
Stringham, Market Chosen Law, 14J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 53, 70 (1999).
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tive base, even in the absence of central governmental planning,
can be drawn from what occurs in other network industries, such
as the technological field. Take, for example, the market for fac-
simile machines. One uniform standard for all fax machines is
followed across the globe; all faxes operate in accordance with this
shared standard, which enables intercommunication. This stan-
dard crystallized in a competitive market, without any government
intervention. 142 The same is true with regard to networks in bank-
ing, credit, computers, and the Internet, 143 as well as the QWERTY
standard for the order of letters on keyboards.' 44 The prediction
that standard legal rules will emerge in a polycentric market is also
supported by the historic experience that has amassed in relation
to the market for law itself:14 the mercantile law that evolved across
Europe consolidated privately and, from a random collection of
normative systems, crystallized gradually into a coherent and coor-
dinated legal system.
1 4 6
Claiming that the structure of the law necessitates standardiza-
tion cannot necessarily justify government monopolization in this
field. 147 Standardization, albeit partial or sub-optimal, can form also
in market conditions, for, given an identical set of considerations,
every consumer will prefer to consume a good that is compatible
with the network over a good that deviates from that standard.
However, sometimes the sets of considerations are not uniform,
and in many cases, a supplier or consumer of the law will actually
derive considerable utility from deviating from the prevalent legal
standard. But this is precisely the point: the monolithic law ap-
proach is not necessarily the most efficient one. The application of
one uniform law is not desirable in all circumstances. 4 s The claim
that the legal rule market has a certain innate bias towards
142. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 121, at 434.
143. See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust Economics of Net-
works, 10 ANTITRUST 36, 37 (1996).
144. S.J. Leibowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, TheFable of the Keys, 33J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990).
145. Another example is the international law sphere. Enrico Colombatto &Jonathan
R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation
State, 18 CARDOZo L. REv. 925 (1996).
146. HAROLDJ. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LE-
GAL TRADITION (1983).
147. This is evidenced by the fact that human society succeeds in functioning and or-
dering legal relations, including amongst citizens of different states, despite the absence of
one shared global government. See NARVESON, supra note 4, at 221; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD,
POWER AND MARKET: GOVERNMENT AND THE ECoNoMY 4 (2d ed. 1977).
148. Take, for example, the inherenty problematic nature of applying a uniform law in
matters concerning marriage and family law. On the background of the split in values and
ideology in this area between the different sectors in society, applying a uniform law is likely
to emerge as undesirable.
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standardization does not necessitate the conclusion that full and
absolute standardization is desirable in this area. 49 Government
intervention and normative uniformity bear economic costs. The a
priori approach of uniform law in fact fundamentally precludes the
legal product's suitability to distinct consumer preferences of the
individuals subject to that law. In certain instances, this conception
is likely to constitute an obstacle to attaining efficiency. 5°
It is important to stress that the equilibrium between conver-
gence and divergence that will emerge in market conditions will
not be optimal, since the consumer in the private structure may
not internalize the social utility of belonging to a network. But this
does not negate the claim that this sub-optimal equilibrium is pref-
erable to the equilibrium point that arises currently under the state
law model. Thus, in the state framework, the monolithic legal or-
der that applies in a given geographic area is arbitrarily established
in accordance with territorial-state boundaries. These boundaries
constitute, at most, the historic remnants of geopolitical develop-
ments. The arbitrariness of the territorial parameters and
monolithic status of the state law within those parameters are an
impediment to achieving legal diversity in the internal state con-
text. The state law model is an obstacle also in the context of the
formation of a legal network that transcends state boundaries; '5 it
hinders contending with cross-border social phenomena,152 some-
thing that is most prominently manifested in the field of
international trade. In a private market structure, in contrast,
there would be no such random and arbitrary dichotomy based on
state borders. In this respect, the private model facilitates diversifi-
cation not only in the law's content but also in its general
configuration: a competitive structure can be expected to stimulate
prosperous legal networks of varying scopes and sizes. In some of
the law's branches (as in the case of lex mercatoria), the functional
size of the legal network can be expected to exceed the territorial-
state borders of our time. In other branches of the law (marriage
149. See Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser,
16J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987).
150. Bruce H. Kobayaski & Larry E. Ribstein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evi-
dence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 464, 469-70 (1996).
151. See Michael I. Krauss, Regulation vs. Markets in the Development of Standards, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. LJ. 781, 798 (1994).
152. The phenomenon of the crystallization of normative standards that transcend state
boundaries is gaining impetus despite the obstacle of state law. However, the state structure
increases the transaction costs entailed in this process. Moreover, in other areas, such as
criminal law, the state structure prevents completely standardization of this type.
153. SeeJohn 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime
of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903 (1996).
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and divorce), the networks can be expected to be narrower in
scope relative to that of today's state entities. And in yet other in-
stances, a certain overlap can be expected in the size of the
network that will emerge in the framework of a competitive market
and the scope of the state law.
151
2. The Problem of Legal Lock-in
The efficiency of the private system is not a matter only of
whether or not it will be possible to institute a uniform legal re-
gime. Rather, it is a broader issue that relates also to the content of
the uniform legal standard that will be established, if at all. In this
context, I will point to an additional failure, that of over conver-
gence: namely the lock-in that is likely to arise in a private market
for law due to the network characteristics of this industry.55 The
lock-in phenomenon occurs whenever a certain standard that was
adopted in the framework of a network industry (in its capacity as
the first standard adopted in the market or based on a set of condi-
tions that have since disappeared) becomes less suitable. However,
since it is the prevailing standard, there is incentive for the agen-
cies that comprise the network to adhere to it so that they can
continue to reap the utility of belonging to an established and
large network (i.e., path dependence). One of the most cited ex-
amples in the literature relates to the perseverance of the
"QWERTY" standard for keyboards. 156 It is claimed that this stan-
dard is less efficient than alternative standards (such as the
"DVORAK" standard) and actually slows down typing. Yet despite
the recognition of the inefficiency of the QWERTY standard, there
has been no move to deviate from it, due to coordination costs and
the utility that members derive from belonging to the "QWERTY
network."
57
This may also be the case with regard to the law network: in
market conditions, the private legal entities may refrain from shift-
ing to new and preferable legal regimes, since unilateral
detachment from the existing legal network would amount to a
forfeiting of the private utility inherent to belonging to the
154. BENSON, supra note 4, at 300.
155. Gillette, supra note 112; see also Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,
107 QJ. ECON. 797 (1992); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and
Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. EcoN. 992 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
156. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985).
157. Id. at 334-35.
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network. In a decentralized structure, the private law suppliers and
consumers will likely fail to internalize the social utility entailed in
the adoption of efficient legal rules and may prefer instead less ef-
ficient rules, so as not to exit the "legal network."5 s Due to the
private utility of belonging to the prevailing legal network and the
coordination costs entailed in consolidating a critical mass of con-
sumers who will be willing to transfer to an alternative legal
regime, a negative incentive arises for legislative enterprise. This
faulty incentive system is likely to lead to legal stagnation-to col-
lective adherence to the inferior legal regime and resistance to a
coordinated shift from the status quo to the more efficient legal
standard."9 Accordingly, one of the sharpest points of criticism that
can be levied against privatizing the market for law is that the state
structure might actually ensure a richer platform for legal devel-
opment and is likely to generate, at the end of the day, legal rules
that do not stagnate, since the centralization inherent to the state
law enables a coordinated shift to preferable legal standards.'
60
However, in this context as well the picture is not necessarily so
harsh. In many cases, the direct network effects do not stem from
the utility of the aggregate consumption of the entire body of
network members, but rather from that of a certain group of those
members. The transaction costs of the shift to a sophisticated stan-
dard for such sub-groups are lower than the costs entailed in a shift
by all of the network consumers, turning a coordinated move into
a probable likelihood. In the context of the law, there are a con-
siderable number of areas of social ordering in which the
reciprocal relations arise mainly between small and defined
groups. In these instances, there is a viable possibility of negotia-
tions between the entities that comprise the different sub-groups
for the purpose of a coordinated move to preferable legal stan-
dards and internalization of the externalities inherent to the
lock-in phenomenon.
Indeed, from the historical perspective, we see development and
entrepreneurship in law, despite the network characteristics of this
industry.' 6' The private legal systems, such as the Law Merchant (lex
158. It should be noted that the normative lock-in phenomenon is not unique to the
private legal model. There is a not inconsiderable amount of normative locking-in in the
state law framework as well; this is the very function performed, by definition, by the binding
legal precedent. However, in the state model, there are accelerated channels of develop-
ment, such as the framework of statutory legislation.
159. Katz, supra note 127, at 1750.
160. Gillette, supra note 126, at 821.
161. Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 981, 995
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
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mercatoria), had considerable flexibility and evolved at a fast pace.162
The same is true with regard to the evolution of social institutions
such as language, religion, and social norms and etiquette. These
mechanisms evolve and flourish, even without government inter-
ference and despite their network dimension.
6 3
II. CARTELIZATION TENDENCIES
The discussion to this point has focused on failures that stem
from the existence of externalities in the markets for legislation
and adjudication. An additional market failure results from the fact
that the law manifests features of a natural monopoly. The concern
is that privatizing the law will lead to the establishment of a "pri-
vate" monopoly in the market for social ordering. An alternative
variation of this prototype of market failure relates to the emer-
gence of cartels in the market for law-to the formation of a small
number of giant entities for supplying legislative and judicial ser-
vices that can cooperate and exploit their aggregate power to cause
injury to the consuming public.
6 4
A. Nozick's Model
Professor Nozick's model, 16 5 set forth in his book Anarchy, State
and Utopia,'6 6 will serve as the departure point for the discussion of
the monopolization tendency in the market for law. Nozick's
162. Bruce L. Benson, Legal Evolution in Primitive Societies, 144 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 772 (1988).
163. Of course, there are many cases of government intervention in these institutions.
For example, in many places across the world, there is no separation of state and religion.
Many states foster "official languages" and promote their development by means of such
entities as academies of language or subsidization of the study and instruction of the lan-
guage in state schools and universities. I merely claim that it is possible to invoke any
number of examples, historical and current, of the development of the institutions of lan-
guage, religion, and currency without any government intervention.
164. Daniels, supra note 112, at 147-48 ("Anti-competitive activity in the case of legisla-
tion production may take the form of a collusive agreement among governments to refrain
from legislative innovation in an effort to maintain stable market shares.").
165. The issue of monopolization in the market for protection embodies a narrow as-
pect of Nozick's theory. Nozick sought to examine the legitimacy of the minimal state and
arrived at the general conclusion that it is rooted in the state's evolution from Dominant
Protection Agencies. He considered whether a society founded on the Lockean state of
nature will remain in a state of anarchy. His conclusion was that the move to the minimal
state will occur automatically without impairment to the natural rights of any person. This
process serves as the basis for Nozick's justification of the existence of the minimal state and
its moral legitimacy.
166. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
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propositions were directed primarily against the enforcement func-
tion, but can be derivatively applied also to privatization of the
judicial and legislative functions. Nozick asserted that there are
benefits to scale in the supply of protection services, due to
which a competitive market for social ordering will not be suffi-
ciently stable. According to Nozick, at the end of the day, the
market forces will lead to the emergence of a "Dominant Protec-
tion Agency" ("DPA"), which will have a monopolistic status in the
given territorial realm. The reason for this is rooted in the fact that
the quality of the protection services offered by each agency will
derive from its relative size in the market and will be contingent on
the quality of the protection services supplied by competing agen-
cies1 6t Unlike other goods with differential value, claimed Nozick,
in the case of protection services and social ordering, there is no
possibility of evenly balanced competition amongst competing
suppliers.6 9 Due to the need for a determination in favor of one or
the other, agencies of equal power will not be able to coexist; in-
deed, in this situation, violent clashes amongst them are to be
expected. 7 ° Moreover, according to Nozick, the power discrepan-
cies amongst the agencies can be expected to reproduce
themselves: the value of an agency that supplies protection services
of a sub-maximal quality will drop disproportionately with the
growth in the number of consumers of the agency that supplies
maximal protection services. The very existence of a gap between
the protection agencies impairs the quality of the services that the
weaker agency can supply and enhances the quality of the services
the stronger agency can supply. This serves as the basis for the con-
tinued growth of the strong agency and the decline of the weaker




The starting point for Nozick is the Lockean state of nature. Ac-
cording to Nozick, in the majority of cases, the social peace and
order will be preserved. However, from time to time, violations of
individuals' rights will occur, whether inadvertently or intention-
ally. In response to this, voluntary associations for the purpose of
protection are likely to form, which will be able to make use of
their aggregate power and (shared) strong arm to fight the battle
of the innocent victim. Business entrepreneurs can be expected to
identify the profit potential of this process and to offer protection
167. See GREGORY S. KAvKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 172 (1986).
168. Osterfeld, supra note 71, at 60.
169. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 68-69.
170. NozICK, supra note 166, at 16.
171. Id. at 17.
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services for a fee. In the state of nature, therefore, organizations
offering protection services are likely to arise-Protective Associa-
tions ("PAs"). Of course, at the preliminary stage, many protection
agencies will operate concurrently and the consumer will be able
to choose from amongst them, as well as belong to a number of
PAs simultaneously. And yet, in light of the benefit to scale in the
market for protection and the fact that the actual size of the pro-
tection agency impacts directly on the quality of the services it can
supply, Nozick proposed three possible scenarios of inter-agency
disputes. The first is the persistence of a war between two protec-
tion agencies until one emerges victor. In such a situation, the
customers of the losing agency will join the winning agency. The
former will go bankrupt and will exit the market, while the latter
will intensify its power. The second possibility is that, in order to
improve its situation and chances of winning, each of the agencies
will concentrate its power in one relatively limited geographic area.
Each agency will then establish itself as the dominant agency in the
realm in which it is concentrated and will enjoy preferential status
relative to its rival. The final possibility is an effective balance be-
tween the two agencies. According to Nozick, in this situation, the
agencies will be incentivized to cooperate and subject themselves
to a supra-apparatus for deciding the dispute between them, in or-
der to avoid the enormous expenses entailed in conducting an
unending war, which would shrink their profit share. Nozick main-
tained that all three outcomes will lead, with time, to the effective
establishment of a Dominant Protection Agency in a given geo-
graphic area. This will be the result either of the amassment of
power by one agency and removal of all of its competitors from the
market or else of the formation of a confederation of agencies that
unite under one shared organizational roof to establish a Domi-
nant Protection Agency. The DPA is considered by Nozick to be the
prototype state.1
72
172. There are fundamental differences between the DPA and the minimal state. Thus,
from a formal perspective, no one is forced to belong to the DPA. Every individual is enti-
tled to protect his property and life by himself. At the same time, the DPA is not obligated to
protect non-members. In the described sense, the DPA embodies a de facto monopoly in
the supply of law and enforcement services, in contrast to the de jure monopoly that charac-
terizes the state. At later stages of his discussion, Nozick turns to an examination of the shift
from the ultra-minimal state to the minimal state, which runs a coercive monopoly in its
territory. See NozICK, supra note 166, at 23.
WINTER 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
B. Cowen's Model
Professor Tyler Cowen's cartel model'73 can be set alongside
Nozick's model of the monopoly in the market for law. Cowen's
conception is grounded, to a large extent, on Nozick's theory, in its
reference to the evolutionary progression from the Lockean state
of nature to the ultra-minimal state. There is also a fundamental
similarity to the basic gist of their discussions: both Nozick and
Cowen raise the possibility of private protection agencies formulat-
ing agreements to settle disputes between them peacefully. As a
result, both predict the emergence, with time, of a monolithic law
and enforcement order in a given geographic space. However,
whereas Nozick stresses the tendency towards monopolization in
the market for law, Cowen's underlying fundamental claim is that
cooperation in the market for law and protection will foster cartel-
like behavior.14 According to Cowen, it is not an inevitability that
one legal agency will predominate; rather, even in a situation of a
multiplicity of agencies, the necessity to cooperate with competing
agencies in order to survive financially and the need to create a
network of inter-agency contractual relations and arrangements
will impel the separate agencies to operate as a cartel.
1 5
Cowen's doctrine connects to the previous parts of the discus-
sion in this Article with regard to the network characteristics of the
law (and protection) industry. As argued there, the network struc-
ture of the law industry results in mutual dependency amongst
competing law suppliers. 176 The private law suppliers are driven to
cooperate (even minimally) in order to persevere as businesses:
supplying law services outside of the network changes the charac-
ter and quality of the services so fundamentally that it is likely to
amount to a death sentence for the departing agency. Accordingly,
the legislation and adjudication entities must adapt themselves to
the legal network's prevailing standards and institute a framework
for arranging disputes amongst them. This is in contrast to indus-
tries dealing with standard goods or services, where there is no
need for such cooperation amongst competitors. It is the interde-
pendence amongst competing law suppliers which gives rise to the
fear of cartelization in the market for law. The ramification of the
described cooperation, according to Cowen, is the neutralization
173. Tyler Cowen & Daniel Sutter, The Costs of Cooperation, 12 REv. AUSTRIAN ECON. 161
(1999); Cowen, supra note 139; Tyler Cowen, Comment, Rooinder to David Friedman on the
Economics of Anarchy, 10 ECON. & PHIL. 329 (1994).
174. For additional differences, see MORRIS, supra note 9, at 70.
175. Cowen, supra note 139, at 259.
176. Id.
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of the competitive element of the market for social ordering. Per
Cowen, the very ability to settle disputes between competing agen-
cies by peaceful means is an indication of the resistance of these
industries to the forces that, in regular circumstances, curb carteli-
zation. If the private law agencies succeed in uniting to formulate
inter-agency covenants and choice of law rules, they will be able to
use this cooperation as a platform for creating trade restraints and
preventing new participants from entering the market. As derived
from Cowen's theory, at the base of those very same characteristics
and abilities that enable the law and protection agencies to avoid a
Hobbesian war of all against all lies their power to operate a cartel
in the markets for social ordering.
In general, then, Cowen can be read as follows: the very ability
to overcome the first category of market failures in the private
market for law (supply of the public goods encompassed in the law
and protection industry) paves the way to the market failure of the
second type (the cartelization tendency in the markets for protec-
tion and law) .177 According to Cowen, there are only two possible
outcomes to the privatization of the markets for legislation and
adjudication: anarchy in the Hobbesian sense (the collapse of
these markets, i.e., a perpetual state of war of all against all) 178 or
mutual cooperation amongst law and protection suppliers, which
will lead, in the long-run, to non-competitive cartels in the market
for social ordering. 179 Under the second constellation, all of the
advantages of privatizing the law will go to waste: the consumers of
the law services will be exposed to a drastic decline in the quality of
the legal services offered, to a sharp increase in the cost of these
services, and, in general, to exploitation by the law and social or-
dering agencies. 18 Cowen's and Nozick's stances are presumably
supported by the empiric experience regarding the practical and
ideological triumph of state law and its institutions;8 1 indeed,
177. The mirror image of this logic failure constitutes sharp criticism against the social
contract theories. As explained at the outset of this Article, under the Hobbesian concep-
tion, governmental coercion is a condition for the supply of public goods-first and
foremost, the public good of peace/social order. And yet it is possible to regard the very act
of uniting for the purpose of formulating a social covenant and for constituting the state as a
type of public good in itself. See supra note 53.
178. Caplan & Stringham, supra note 139.
179. See Daniels, supra note 112, at 147; Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Impli-
cations of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 517 (1998).
180. Cowen, supra note 139, at261.
181. MoRRis, supra note 9, at 98.
WINTER 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
human society started out in a state of anarchy and today it is com-
prised of a multitude of states and state law.'2
INTERIM SUMMARY
The discussion thus far has been devoted to a consideration of
the question of whether the law-in all its functional institutions-
can evolve in a state of nature and in the absence of government
support. As I sought to demonstrate, privatization in the markets
for legislation and adjudication may result in two types of market
failures: failures that stem from the existence of externalities in the
judicial and legislative markets and failures originating in the car-
telization tendency. However, in order to make a definitive
determination with regard to how legislative and judicial services
should be supplied, it is not sufficient to merely point to the exis-
tence of such market failures. Rather, it is necessary to compare
between the flaws entailed in the private supply of these services
and the problems that arise in the framework of public supply. It
cannot be a priori assumed that the state necessarily functions more
efficiently in situations in which the private market fails, or that it
can fix the failures of the market at zero cost.' 8' Much of the criti-
cism that is raised against private supply of services or goods suffers
from a basic bias in favor of the state alternative, due to an asym-
metric comparison between utopian public models and realistic
private models. 84 This asymmetric comparison stands also at the
foundation of Hobbes's and Locke's doctrines, each of whom
dwelled on the flaws in the supply of social ordering in the state of
nature, without conducting an insightful inquiry into the flaws
likely to arise in the alternative state framework. State intervention
comes at a cost, and the public supply of legislation and adjudica-
tory services is not free of flaws. I will not vastly expand on this
point (for it is a negative attack on the social contract theories, as
opposed to the positive tack taken by this Article) and will only
182. For a discussion of the historical developments that led to the establishment of the
Western states, see BERMAN, supra note 146. A possible response to this empiric criticism is
that the state law model could well be a necessary stopover on the way to the polycentric
legal model, in light of its crucial importance for the allocation of primary resources and
rights. But this model must not be seen as the necessary end station. In this respect, the
polycentric model is likely to be suited not to pre-state-law times but to the post-state-law
period.
183. SeeJosEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 88 (3d ed. 2000).
184. Demsetz termed this approach "the nirvana approach." Harold Demsetz, Informa-
tion and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12J.L. & EcON. 1, 1 (1969).
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raise a small number of points to elucidate the matter, beginning
with state legislation.
Inherent to the state legislative system are the same failures of
under-incentive to become efficient that characterize all public-
sector bodies. Under the state model, the incentive system is not
strong enough to drive legislators to enact efficient or quality laws.
Their salaries and professional advancement are not directly de-
pendent on the degree of utility generated by the legislative
products they generate. Despite the fact that legislators are subject
to public scrutiny due to the need to be reelected each term, they
are not directly subject to the market forces. is Moreover, as proven
by the public choice literature, it is precisely this need to succeed
in future elections that incentivizes state legislators to enter into
agreements with interest groups to pass sectoral legislation, which
promotes a narrow agenda at the expense of the public at large
and the aggregate social utility.18 6 Thus, under public choice theory,
the state legislation processes are channeled to the good of power-
ful sectors and narrow interest groups, at the expense of the
general public interest. 18 7 The public legislation is "sold" to the
highest bidder by legislators, in exchange for electoral and finan-
cial support, and "bought" by interest groups.1'8 These groups seek
to push the state legislator in the direction of legislation that suits
their set of preferences, towards protecting regulation in areas in
which the existing arrangement promotes their interests 9 or to-
wards preventing regulation in other areas. 90 The central factor
that impacts an interest group's "buying power "'91 is not the quanti-
tative variable (i.e., its numeric size), but rather the force of its
interests and degree of its concentration. Small and concentrated
interest groups, with a higher interest per capita, will generally be
more effective in attaining benefits in the area of legislation than
185. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innova-
tion, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).
186. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L.
REv. 873,906 (1987).
187. Hummel, supra note 48, at 1241.
188. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975).
189. Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater: Justice Breyer's
Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 722 (1995).
190. Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regula-
tion, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 102 (1987).
191. The use of the concept "buying power" is qualified, of course, by the recognition
of the fact that, in the political context, it is not possible to convert money for votes on a
one-for-one basis.
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large and dispersed interest groups, like the public at large.' 92 This
stems, primarily, from the costs of collective action and associa-
tion, 1 3 which increase more rapidly than the growth of the group
in size. 94 An additional factor in this context touches on homoge-
neity of the group's set of interests. The more homogeneous the
potential group, the lower the collective action costs, and, in any
event, groups that unite around a narrow set of interests wield a
prominent advantage over the general public. 5 The state law
model is therefore likely to produce legislative products that are
biased in favor of the narrow interests of strong, concentrated
segments of society, all at the expense of the aggregate social wel-
fare.196
Non-exposure to the market forces impairs not only the incen-
tive to legislate efficient laws but also the effective ability to do so.
The mechanism for the transfer of information between elected
public representatives and the state's citizenry is immeasurably
more ambiguous and limited than the signals provided by the
market forces and the pricing mechanism in the private sector.197 In
this sense, state legislation can be analogized to central economic
planning, 98 under which decisions are made by a small number of
decision-makers who are shown only isolated segments of the over-
all information picture.' 99 The dispersed character of the
information necessary for choosing efficient laws, which derives
from how each individual behaves in the market, precludes any
ability on the part of the central authority to accumulate this in-
formation and process it into an efficient legislative planning
192. Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice;
Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv.
1079, 1080 (1993).
193. Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 7, 16 (2000).
194. GeorgeJ. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 3
(1971).
195. BENSON, supra note 4, at 90. But cf George]. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action:
An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 359 (1974).
196. MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MAR-
KETS 91 (1981); Ludwig von Mises, The Clash of Group Interests, in APPROACHES TO NATIONAL
UNITY: FIFTH SYMPOSIUM OF THE CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND RELIGION 148
(Lyman Bryson et al. eds., 1945), reprinted in MONEY, METHOD, AND THE MARKET PROCESS:
ESSAYS BY LUDWIG VON MISES 202 (Richard M. Ebeling ed., 1990).
197. As a result of the limited influence of each individual on the contents of the legis-
lation that is passed in a democratic regime, the "rational ignorance" phenomenon arises.
See Ilya Somin, Essay, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413, 435-38
(1998).
198. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1645-46 (1996).
199. BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAw 22 (3d ed. 1991).
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rule.20 0 The detachment from the market forces in the state model
and the accompanying lack of information lead to incompatibility
between market needs and the legislation that is formulated. They
result in the adoption of inefficient laws.
Moreover, the described inefficiency relates not only to the sub-
stance or quality of the laws that are enacted under the state
model, but also to their quantity. Due to the fact that changes to
legislation are not a direct function of consumer pressure and to
the fact that lawmakers can externalize some of the enforcement
costs associated with legislation, we are witness to the phenomenon
of over-legislation. The corpus of state law has grown to enormous
proportions, in excess of market needs, and is subject to excessively
frequent changes.20' Modern society is collapsing under the weight• 202
of hyperlexis, which is reflected in the prevalence of weighty and
complex laws, overflowing with minute details, as well as in the
many and frequent permutations of those laws. As a result of this
inflation in laws and regulations, the ordinary citizen lacks the
tools and ability to function effectively in the legal space.2 °3 The vast
dimensions of the body of state law, as well as the inability to sort
through the mountains of information it encompasses, rule out, to
a large extent, any ability to regard it as "a known body of law." In
this sense, the claim can be made that it is in fact the state legisla-
tive systems that suffer from the legislative failure Locke ascribed to
the state of nature.2 4
The problems inherent to the public legislation system are not
unique to statutory legislation. Scholars such as Rubin, Priest, Pos-
ner, and Goodman maintain that the relative decentralization of
judge-made law will lead to the formulation of legal rules of basi-
cally efficient content. And yet we find in judicial legislation the
very same underlying problems of lack of information and faulty
incentive system that characterize all public bodies. Similar to
200. This contradicts, of course, the "constructive rationalism" fiction at the base of the
positivist approach, which is grounded on the conceptual ability of centralist bodies, such as
the legislature, to store and process the information relevant for constituting an efficient
and proper legal regime.
201. For further discussion of the "inflation" in state legislation, see LEONI, supra note
199, at 17.
202. AUERBACH, supra note 10, at 9.
203. As a result of this, in many fields people do not even bother to familiarize them-
selves with the letter of the law or to learn the "applicable law," which is instead replaced by
social norms and accepted customary rules. See ELLICKSON, supra note 15; see also Jonathan
R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123,1126 (1997).
204. Roderick T. Long, The Nature of Law Part I: Law and Order Without Government, 1
FoRMULA-iu ONS (1994) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform),
available at http://libertariannation.org/a/fl3l2.html.
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statutory legislation, the state judiciary system also enjoys monop-
oly power. The public is forced to accept the binding force of the
legal precedent.
Moreover, it may be claimed that the very pursuit of the efficient
legal rule, under the "efficiency of the common law paradigm," is a
futile attempt. The search for the efficient legal rule rests on the
latent premise that there is one uniform efficient legal rule for the
entirety of the public. However, the very assumption of a mono-
lithic and uniform legal rule can impede efficiency. A public
system that supplies, by definition, monolithic and uniform law
may be inefficient for this very reason alone.
In general, the public supply of law is grounded on a faulty in-
centive and informational foundation for achieving efficiency. The
state legislation and adjudication mechanisms are weighed down
by bureaucracy, produce "too much law," and impede the ability to
monitor and control the quality and quantity of the legal product.
Since government intervention leads to an oversupply of law, even
the concern of under-supply of laws and legal rules in the framework
of the private market (due to their nature as public goods) does not
a priori tip the balance in favor of government intervention. A com-
parison must be made between the costs embodied in legislative
under-innovation and those entailed in over-innovation. 6 The same
holds in the context of attaining the optimal extent of standardiza-
tion in the law. Whereas a private market is likely to reach a state of
legal under-standardization, a public market is likely to be over-
standardized. The broader picture reveals that, in fact, every market
failure in the private model of law has a counterpart in the political
market, which adheres to the state law model. The claim being
made, therefore, is that the inherent drawbacks of a private legal
system must be assessed in light of the shortcomings typifying pub-
lic legal systems. We must not focus exclusively on the failures of
the private model, led by the assumption that the government can
fix them at zero cost. Proponents of the state solution must show,
additionally, that this systemic structure for supplying the law
produces more efficient outcomes than those that emerge under a
private structure.
Most importantly, even if at the end of the day it emerges that its
market failures turn the private model into the less attractive op-
tion of the two, this does not end the discussion. The two
alternatives-full privatization of the legislation and adjudication
markets versus the complete state law model--do not exhaust the
205. Further on I address the economic utility embodied in the existence of uniformity.
206. BENSON, supra note 4, at 286.
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entire spectrum of possibilities for the relationship between the
state and the law. Between these two extremes of absolutely no
state intervention in the law (full privatization of the legislative and
judicial functions) and full intervention (monocentric state law),
there is a long row of intermediate formats of limited state inter-
vention. These moderate configurations rest on the abandonment
of the dichotomy that arises from the Hobbesian and Lockean doc-
trines, between a monocentric public legal order and sweeping
non-intervention on the part of the state. These middle-ground
solutions can take many different forms, such as dividing the state
law into a number of possible legal protocols 20 7 or establishing a
federal legal system in which the majority of the legislation and
adjudication activity occurs at the local level.
The rest of the discussion will be devoted to outlining the con-
tours of one such intermediate point along the privatization
spectrum. In this framework, I will seek to illustrate how it is possi-
ble to correct the market failures of the legislative and judicial
markets with state intervention that is more limited than that char-
acterizing the monocentric state law model. I will show that despite
the fact that state intervention is imperative for ensuring the fund-
ing and supply of public goods in these markets, overcoming these
market failures does not mandate, and does not justify, the mo-
nopolistic production of legislative and judicial services by the
state.2 ' The same is true with regard to the cartelization tendency: I
will show that thin state intervention, aimed at antitrust arrange-
ments in the legislation and adjudication markets, will successfully
neutralize this market failure.2° In other words, I will demonstrate
by means of the intermediate model that the mere identification of
market failures in the markets for legislation and adjudication does
not serve to justify the monopolistic model of state law. This has
implications also for the Hobbesian and Lockean justifications dis-
cussed above: if it is possible to correct the failures in the
administration ofjustice in the state of nature by way of state inter-
vention that is more restricted than the monocentric state law
model, then the teleological component of their doctrines loses its
justificatory force.
207. For an interesting analogy in the context of international law, see MarkJ. Sundahl,
The "Cape Town Approach": A New Method of Making International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 339 (2006).
208. See GARETH D. MYLES, PUBLIC ECONOMIcs 236 (4th ed. 2002).
209. For an analogous claim made in the context of the protection market, see John
Hasnas, Reflections on the Minimal State, 2 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 115, 123-24 (2003) (discussing
the remedial state, which is more limited than the minimal state, in that it is restricted to
correcting failures in the market for protection, as opposed to supplying protection services
by itself).
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PART C: A PROPOSAL OF PARTIAL STATE INTERVENTION IN THE
SUPPLY OF LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION
The intermediate model that I will discuss here rests on recip-
rocity between the public legal system and the private systems and
on using each system to improve the functioning of the other. The
proposition conceives of the existing state law model and the fully
privatized model as complementary solutions, as opposed to mutu-
ally exclusive alternatives, for the supply of legislative and judicial
services. Although not completely eliminating the institution of
state law, it turns the majority of the system into default rules, while
simultaneously granting sweeping rights to opt out in favor of pri-
vate legal regimes and adjudicative bodies. 210 Coercive state law is
reduced to a small kernel, limited to correcting the failures of the
legislative and judicial markets. The enforcement function will re-
main in the state's hands, which, in addition to public judicial
verdicts, will enforce also the decisions made in the framework of
the state-licensed private adjudicatory systems. The "players" in the
legal arena alongside the state will be the private legislative and
judicial entities that are granted official recognition. These law
agencies will be able to set choice of law rules for ordering the
network of relations amongst themselves. It will be possible for
them to apply one set of legal rules for intra-agency interactions
amongst members of the same agency or legal community and an-
other set of rules for "boundary-crossing" interactions between one
agency's members and the members of other agencies. Each of
these points will be expounded on below.
Under the proposed model, there will be a general right to opt
out of the state law for private legal agencies. This right will grant
an exemption from the component of the general tax that relates
to legal services (payment for the funding of the public law system
will be made by means of the legal agencies to which the exiting
individuals belong). In addition, an individual who chooses to opt
out of the public legal system will not be subject to the default state
legislation. However, at the same time, he will be precluded from
making use of the state law: he will not be able to file a suit based
on the state law, nor will he be able to resort to the services of the
state judicial system in the event of a dispute. Rather, he will be
210. Exit rights have been defined by Dagan and Heller as" 'voluntarily leaving the ef-
fective jurisdiction of the group.'" Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons,
110 YALE L.J. 549, 568 (2001) (quoting Leslie Green, infra this footnote). For an extensive
discussion of the issue of exit, see also ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970); Leslie Green, Rights
of Exit, 4 LEGAL THEORY 165, 171 (1998).
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subject to the legislative and judicial orders of the law agency he
chose upon exiting. (One possible exception, which will be clari-
fied further on, would be in the context of the arbitration of
disputes between an individual who chose to exercise his right to
exit the public system and the private law agency to which he be-
longs. In such cases, it will be possible to appeal to the public
system to adjudicate the dispute."') At the same time, the option of
partial exit will also be available, incidental to a specific dispute or
particular legal context. Partial exit will not accord a general ex-
emption from paying tax for the public system; moreover, the
partially exiting individual will remain subject to the state legal or-
der except in the framework of the specific area in which he chose
to exercise his exit right. Ex-ante exercise of the exit right will also
be possible, that is, in pre-dispute situations, and in such cases, uni-
lateral exit will be sufficient. Alternatively, it will also be possible to
realize the exit right ex-post, particularly in post-dispute contexts,
but this will be contingent on the consent of all involved parties
(similar to the current practice of signing an arbitration note).
The state legal system will remain for the purpose of the follow-
ing four central goals:
1. The public system will serve individuals or bodies
that have refrained from ex-ante realization of their
right to opt out of the public system and have cho-
sen to continue to belong to this system. These
individuals will be required to pay the tax compo-
nent related to supply of legal services and release
from this payment will be subject to the current cri-
teria for a general income tax exemption. Anyone
who does not exercise their right to exit the public
legal system will automatically continue to make use
of the system, as is currently the case.
2. The state system will constitute the default system
for determining disputes between different law
agencies, whenever these agencies do not succeed
in settling the disputes between them (or between
their customers) by peaceful means. In determining
these disputes, the public judges will be authorized
to rule based on the state law but also to deviate
211. An additional exception relates to those situations in which the parties to a dispute
choose jointly to turn to the state system, after having exited at an earlier stage. In such
cases, the appeal to the public system will entail a one-time-only fee, which will be signifi-
cantly higher than the symbolic fee paid by someone who did not make a-priori use of his
right to exit the public system.
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from that law when justice considerations so man-
date. They will also be permitted to refer the
dispute between agency A and agency B to private
agency C for determination.
3. A third purpose of the public system will be the ar-
bitration of cases between individuals who opted
out of the state system and the law agencies to
which they chose to belong.
4. The state law system will also order the private law
market. It will set the licensing mechanisms for pri-
vate law agencies and will order the prevention of
antitrust arrangements in the markets for legislation
and adjudication.
Each private law agency that applies for a license will be required
to make an ongoing tax payment to the public system. In addition,
when appealing to the public judicial system (due to the emer-
gence of a dispute between two legal agencies), private agencies
will be required to pay a fine to the public system that is higher
than the regular tax payment. This fine will serve a dual purpose: it
will be used both to fund the public system and for the purpose of
creating a positive incentive for the law agencies to resolve their
disputes peacefully. Alongside the ex-ante right to exit the public
system, an ex-post exit right will also be granted, subject to the con-
sent of the two sides to the dispute. There will also be a
symmetrical ex-post ability to exit the private systems and to return
to the state judicial system.
The public enforcement system will enforce only decisions
handed down by authorized law agencies. The cumulative criteria
that must be met for private law agencies to receive a license and
accreditation will be as follows:
1) a minimal amount of members who voluntarily
212choose to belong to the private agency;
2) regular payment of a tax to the state treasury (for
the purpose of maintaining the public system) and
payment of fines for turning to the public system in
the event of a dispute with a competing agency; and
3) meeting the legal standards set by the state legal sys-
tem for private law agencies in general as well as
212. The intention here is to a minimal number that is set in advance and not to a nu-
merical standard that will be susceptible to government manipulation and tinkering, for
giving the government such latitude would open the door to political impact on the market
for private ordering.
[VOL. 43:2
Separation of Law and State
with regard to the specific law agency (this refers to
the state system's decisions in the context of anti-
trust in the private law industry, as well as judicial
decisions rendered by the state system against the
particular agency in suits brought by one of its cus-
tomers).
Under the proposed model, the "exit right" is defined as referring
only to exit in favor of a recognized private system; that is, only
transfer to a private legal system that has met the stated require-
ments and criteria will release the exiting individual from the
binding authority of the state law (and entitle him to an exemption
from paying the tax for the public system). Resort to a non-
accredited and unauthorized legal system will be devoid of any
meaning: it will not constitute opting out from the state legal sys-
tem, and the person who appeals to that system will be seen as
continuing to belong to the public system (or to the private legal
system to which he belonged at the time of the appeal to the un-
recognized agency).
When a dispute arises, each side will appeal to his or her legal
agency. In disputes between parties that belong to the same private
legal body, judges from the shared agency will make their rulings
based on the normative system that is applied in its framework, and
the decision will be enforced by the public enforcement system. In
instances in which the parties to the dispute belong to different law
agencies, however, the arrangement will be decided by the choice
of law rules that will form between these law agencies (similarly to
the rules existing today in the private international law sphere).
Thus, as repeat-players in the system, it will in many instances be of
advantage to the agencies to set ex-ante choice of law rules or at
least to do so in an ad-hoc fashion retroactively. The private law
agencies will operate similarly to today's insurance and credit com-
panies: the agency will store information regarding its clients and
will act as guarantor in those instances in which clients have acted
in accordance with its legal criteria but have nonetheless become
embroiled in a legal dispute. The state system will serve as the de-
fault forum for determining disputes between different law
agencies, whenever they fail to settle between them, and the law
agencies will be required to pay a considerable fee for such resort
to the public system.
The right to opt out of state law will be limited also insofar as an-
titrust regulations regarding the law industry are concerned. State
law will regulate the private law market and will make illegal any
activity that in any way creates a trade restraint in the private law
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industry. A law agency will be permitted to appeal to the state legal
system if it encounters barriers to entering the law market placed
by other law agencies (for example, the latter enter into an agree-
ment to prevent their clients from entering into contracts with the
members of the new agency). In addition, standing will be granted
also to the consumer public: every individual will be entitled to ap-
peal to the state courts for the purpose of deliberating the matter
of antitrust in the markets for legislation and adjudication.
This is only a preliminary sketch of a possible alternative to the
state law model in its present format. Any number of more compli-
cated permutations are possible, such as allowing concurrent
membership in more than one accredited legal agency-in differ-
ent areas of social ordering or with regard to legal interactions with
different entities. It is also possible to think of scenarios in which
individuals will be able to purchase legislative and judicial services
not only from private systems within the state's borders but also
from competing legal systems in other states. Another of the many
possibilities relates to the institution of mechanisms such as class
213actions brought by individuals or agencies.
The purpose of outlining this alternative polycentric legal re-
gime has been twofold. The first goal was to point to the existence
of weak links in the connection drawn in the teleological element
of the Hobbes and Locke doctrines. A second goal was to propose
and initiate discussion of an alternative legal regime, with the abil-
ity to replace both the state law model and the fully private model,
discussed at the outset of this Article.1 4 In the discussion below, I
will turn to consider some of the advantages and disadvantages in-
herent to this intermediate model relative to each of the two
extreme alternatives: full privatization or monopolistic state law.
213. In the present reality, we are also witnessing the opening up of the legal market to
a certain degree of competition, especially with regard to the judicial function; for example,
there has been the emergence of a range of alternative procedures for determining and
settling disputes, most prominently, the arbitration procedure. But this notwithstanding, the
privatization of legislation and adjudication and the right to exit the state legal system are
currently immeasurably limited relative to the intermediate model outlined here. Thus, for
example, tinder the proposed model, the comprehensive right to exit the state judicial and
legislative systems will not be limited to the civil sphere or to specific legal fields; moreover,
this model exempts, even if partially, those exiting the public system from the burden of its
funding. An additional important divergence relates to the focus on the legislative function:
the majority of the initiatives for privatizing the law thus far have been directed at the judi-
cial function, whereas the proposed model places emphasis also on privatizing the legislative
function and the setting of social policy. Finally, under the proposed model, a change can
be expected in the extent of the public system's monitoring of the private alternatives. State
intervention, for example, in the context of licensing, should be based on essentially formal
demands and not on substantive normative contents.
214. See supra Part A ("A Private Market for Law").
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THE ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED MODEL RELATIVE TO THE
FULLY PUBLIC MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC STATE LAW
In the framework of the model proposed here, the state legal
system will be propelled towards greater efficiency,2 1 5 since it will be
exposed, even if only partially, to the forces of competition. The
shift of consumers to the private systems will alleviate the overload-
ing that currently exists in the public system. Similarly, the private
consumption will provide clearer and more precise indications of
the real value of the judicial and legislative services offered to the
consuming public. It will be possible to make use of the informa-
tion that will materialize to limit government subsidization of law
services to the public utility component alone, thus preventing
over-subsidization of the public judicial system.
The dispersal of the power to legislate amongst competing bod-
ies that check and balance one another will serve as a defense
mechanism against dangerous social experiments. Under a central-
ized legislative regime, the social cost of errors in legislation is
high, due to their broad potential applicability. Under a polycen-
tric model of law, in contrast, each individual legal agency has a
lesser impact on society as a whole.
Decentralizing the power to legislate can also be expected to
bolster the weaker sectors of the state collective. Populations that
are not represented effectively in the state framework will be able
to exercise their exit right collectively and institute legal orders
that reflect their normative worlds, particularly in internal com-
munity contexts, assisted by the state enforcement mechanisms for
executing private judicial decisions. Not only will this improve the
situation of social minority groups, but it will also improve the ex-
tent of the state law's compatibility with general social interests.
This will be achieved by means of instituting legal standards by
which the state law rules can be measured and evaluated; indeed,
the state legal rules will be sifted through the filter of the private
norms to examine the extent of the state law's bias in favor of its
stakeholders' interests. Moreover, in situations in which the state
law serves merely as a mouthpiece for dominant sectors of the state
communality and reflects solely the normative alignment of the
social elites, other social groups will choose to move to private sys-
tems that better reflect their own normative world. The more the
public system shrinks in size, the more expensive the transaction
costs will become for its remaining members in their interactions
215. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON.
23, 34 (1983).
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with the other parts of the population. This will lead to a situation
in which those with a vested interest in the public system will have
an incentive to pass legislation that is more appealing to the gen-
eral public, that is to say, legislation that reflects more precisely the
"general social interest" and responds to the needs of broader sec-
tors of society.26 The decline of the status of the state law under the
proposed model will likely generate a parallel decline in its role as
the wager of social struggles and the source of political conflict.
The state law will continue to enjoy a certain preferential status
and thus will continue to be the focus of the activity of special in-
terest groups; however, it can be assumed that this phenomenon
will wane, particularly due to the ability of entire social groups to
opt out of the state system and arrange their intra-community legal
matters as they see fit. In addition, the right to exit the public sys-
tem can be expected to reduce also the problems of the collective
decision making mechanisms. This will result from, amongst other
things, the minimization of the incentive for rational ignorance:
under the democratic model, a negative incentive exists for the
individual voter to invest the costs and resources entailed in gath-
ering the information necessary for making an educated choice in
the general elections. Part of the difficulty stems from the public
good characteristics of participation in the democratic process.
The negative incentive to invest in amassing information and par-
ticipating in the election procedure intensifies on the background
of the fact that, in the framework of large groups, the lone voice is
unlikely to tip the balance either way or to have a determinative
impact on the legal policy that is eventually adopted and imple-
mented. Under the state model, the question of whether the
implemented legal policy reflects the will of the individual is not
connected to the way in which that individual votes in the elec-
tions. In this way, the public dimension of voting is further
reinforced, as is the phenomenon of rational ignorance on the
part of the voting public. However, the very existence of sweeping
exit rights will turn the participation in the legal functions into an
individual activity and will minimize their basic collective dimen-
sion. Since under the proposed model, each individual will have
the ability in principle to decide according to which legal policy he
acts and in which legal system he participates, the incentive for him
to amass and process the information necessary to making a suc-
cessful choice will increase.
216. Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U.
CFH. L. REV. 1151, 1161 (2000).
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THE ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED MODEL RELATIVE TO THE
FULLY PRIVATE MODEL
The proposed model provides mechanisms for contending with
the market failures that arise in private markets for legislation and
adjudication discussed above. First and foremost, with regard to
the supply of public goods entailed in the judicial function, the
intermediate model corrects the flaw in the fully private model,
which originates in the exclusive reliance on self-interest for peace-
ful resolution of disputes (whether between individuals, entities, or
groups). Due to the possibility of residual coercive resort to the
state judicial system, the model responds to and ensures a final de-
termination of disputes in society. The model's inherent
mechanisms for funding the public judicial system diminish the
ability of those exiting in favor of private judicial systems to free-
ride on the back of the public judicial system.
The same is true with regard to the market for legislation. The
state system will preserve its strength in creating legal rules, and
due to the fact that private systems must compete effectively with
the public system in order to survive from a business perspective,
they will be incentivized to initiate legislation themselves. The state
law will continue to enjoy a certain extent of preferential status (as
the legal corpus by which disputes are likely to be residually
determined); this will assist in the attempt to contend with the free-
riding phenomenon in the supply of public goods that are extra-
neous to the law, such as foreign defense. The feedback from the
state system will ensure an opening for escaping the problem of
over-standardization and legal lock-in. Due to the state's ability to
ensure a concentrated shift to preferable legal rules and due to the
private law agencies' need to compete with the state system, there
will be less incentive for the private systems to lock-in on an infe-
rior legal standard. Finally, the regulatory supervision of the
private law agencies for the purpose of preventing antitrust
arrangements will assist in decreasing the probability of carteliza-
tion in the market for law. Moreover, the very existence of a
competing public legal authority will, in itself, diminish the dam-
age potential of such a private legal cartel.
POSSIBLE CRITICISM OF THE INTERMEDIATE MODEL PROPOSED
The proposed model is, of course, not devoid of flaws, in com-
parison to both the public model and the fully private model. I will
begin from the first perspective. Under the intermediate model,
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the state will supply enforcement services also for decisions that are
rendered by the (authorized) private tribunals. This is despite the
fact that the state's representatives will have no foothold in the ju-
dicial or legislative procedures on which the private judicial verdict
is based. The externalization of the enforcement costs by the pri-
vate law agencies could lead to an over-exploitation of the public
enforcement services and to the enlistment of enforcement
mechanisms for very controversial goals that are not acceptable to
the majority of the public (especially in contexts of inter-
community disputes).
This criticism can, however, be qualified, for under the current
public model, similar questions arise of over- and under-
enforcement, but not between law agencies, but between
individuals. There are those who overuse the public judicial and
enforcement apparatuses, due to their failure to take into
consideration the social cost of enforcement. Others fail to make
adequate use of these systems due to a failure to internalize the
social utility of enforcement. Moreover, the problem of
externalization in enforcement emerges under the public model
also in systemic contexts and political frameworks: due to the
representative problems that arise in the entire legislation
procedure and the ability of elected officials to externalize the
costs of enforcement to taxpayers, the problems of "over-
legislation" and "over-enforcement" arise systemically also in the
framework of the public model.
The enforcement question has been generally excluded from
the framework of the discussion. But we can certainly enhance the
proposed model by thinking of mechanisms that will enable private
law agencies to participate in funding the costs of enforcement, in
a way that contends with the problematic incentives for non-
optimal enforcement.
Another possible line of attack on the intermediate model could
be from the distributional perspective. One of the difficulties en-
tailed in granting a possibility of opting out from public services
relates to the negative effect that the exit of the strong sectors
could potentially have on the functioning of the public systems."'
The concern is that rich consumers' ability to free themselves to a
considerable extent of the state legal systems will leave the weaker
sectors to be the sole consumers of those systems and will eventu-
ally impair the legal services the latter receive. The weak sectors
will be forced to contend with the harsh reality of a (likely dra-
217. Somin, supra note 3, at 803.
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matic) deterioration in the quality of the law services supplied to
them by the public system.
There is room, however, to challenge the premise underlying
this criticism that the underprivileged are destined to be injured by
the exit of the rich from the public law system. Serious doubt can
be raised with regard to this assumption, which, in turn, is
grounded on the latent premise that current public state law sys-
tems fundamentally operate to the advantage of the weak sectors.
In many cases, government services, in general, and legislative and
judicial services, specifically, in fact reinforce regressive trends."" In
the legal context, this is reflected in the economic barriers erected
on the way to court, which deprive the underprivileged of effective
access to the state courts, in contrast to the stronger sectors of the
population who overuse the system. The law's bias in favor of the
society's strong sectors is also evident in how the state law functions
in shaping social behavior, given the political inferiority of the
weaker populations and their inability to organize politically to
promote their interests, as compared to stronger sectors and inter-
est groups. The outcome is, amongst other things, use of the
criminal apparatus as a tool for repressing weak populations and
over-representation of these sectors in the ranks of the accused.
This joins the fact that low income earners also tend to be the vic-
tims of criminal activity to an extremely disproportionate extent
relative to their overall representation in society. In fact, diminish-
ing strong groups' consumption of the public systems, while at the
same time ensuring their participation in their ongoing funding,
might actually improve the law services enjoyed by low income
earners relative to their current options.
Moreover, the right to exit the state law under the intermediate
model, its broad scope and significance notwithstanding, will not
be a full exit right. The state will retain residual authority in dis-
pute determination, and thus even those who choose to consume
private legislation and judicial services will remain with a certain tie
to the public system.
It is also possible to criticize the proposed intermediate model
from the perspective of the fully privatized model. There are draw-
backs even to limited state intervention in the market for law.
Thus, under the proposed model, although the core of state inter-
vention will occur on the enforcement front, a not negligible
extent of intervention can be expected also in the context of the
legislative and adjudication functions. This will be executed by way
of restrictions placed on the right to exit the public system, as well
218. Id. at 804.
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as through government intervention in the licensing procedure for
private law agencies. The public supervision over entry into the
market for law and monitoring of the law agencies' functioning
from the moment of their entry, while binding them to uniform
standards in certain fields, open up the possibility of state impact
on the substantive contents of the private law systems.
An additional difficulty inherent to the proposed model relates
to the natural bias that will emerge in its framework in favor of the
state law and the likely consequent harm to the ability of private
legal bodies to function as an attractive alternative to the state sys-
tem. As described, the public legal system will continue to enjoy a
certain preferential status. To begin with, only the state system will
enjoy government subsidization. Moreover, the public system will
retain residual authority in determining disputes, and this prefer-
ential status will have implications also for the normative contents
of the private systems (particularly in inter-agency interactions). In
this respect, while the proposed model can be expected to mitigate
the preferential status of the state model, it will not completely
eliminate the latter's advantageous position.
This leads to an additional shortcoming, which touches on the
legal standardization phenomenon and the tendency towards
over-conformity with the state law. Due to the state legal system's
relatively preferential status as well as the network structure of the
law industry, private law systems will have a diminished effective
inclination to deviate from the normative order prescribed by the
state law in extra-agency contexts. On the one hand, this will act as
a sort of "safety net" under the proposed model, both against ex-
cessive legal divergence and against the infiltration of problematic
legal contents into the private sector (at least with regard to the
ordering of behavior between agencies or between communities).
Yet on the other hand, it will also likely significantly reduce the ad-
vantages of privatizing the market for law and the positive
consequences of making the legislative and judicial functions sus-
ceptible to the market forces. This phenomenon is likely to place a
practical limitation on the innovativeness of the legal arrange-
ments that emerge in the market for law.
However, there is a most simple response to this final line of
criticism: even if these pessimistic predictions do materialize, at the
very worst, we return to our current point of departure-a mono-
centric model of state law.
In sum, setting a thin public system alongside the private systems
will produce some of the fruits of privatization, while limiting the
accompanying exposure to the market failures likely to arise in a
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completely private market for law. At the same time, it will be pos-
sible to reap some of the benefits of public supply of the law,
without having to suffer (to any significant extent) the disadvan-
tages of monopolistic public systems.
CONCLUSION
The Hobbesian and Lockean social contract theories promote a
monolithic public legal order. From the ills of the social ordering
in the state of nature, the two thinkers drew their justification for
concentrating the legislative and judicial functions in the hands of
the state sovereign. Hobbes spoke of the sovereign in terms of "sole
legislator," while Locke viewed as the solution the creation of a
constitutional government-a regime in which the state monopo-
lizes the legislative, judicial, and enforcement functions (with the
state agent divided into three branches in this context) .29 The legal
model that I have roughly outlined was intended to illustrate the
ability to correct the failures in the market for law also in the
framework of a polycentric legal regime, based on more limited
state intervention in the law. The conclusion that emerges is that
Hobbes's and Locke's claims are valid and compelling arguments
with regard to the justification for state intervention per se in the
markets for legislation and adjudication, but are not a sufficient
basis for justifying the state law model and the intervention in the
form of a state monopoly over the law. Indeed, state intervention is
vital for creating the space in which legal regimes and systems for
dispute determination can grow and set rights. It is not necessary,
however, that the state set these rights itself.
The model that was reviewed here as a preliminary point of ref-
erence represents one possible-but not mandatory--intermediate
solution along the spectrum of privatization. It is possible to con-
ceive of a whole variety of additional configurations of the
privatization of the legislative and judicial functions, also sup-
ported by the theoretical foundation laid in the framework of this
Article-from "lighter" alternatives such as granting broader rec-
ognition to customary law in the framework of formal law, to
instituting mediation proceedings in criminal disputes or forming
legal federations, to more radical models of privatization, such as
219. See Long, supra note 204.
220. Such a model is likely to be based on broader legislative decentralization and on
the shifting of the hub of legislation and adjudication to the local municipal sphere. While
the model does preserve the link between law and territory, it also expands individuals'
choice options with regard to the legal system to which they will be subject. For, indeed, the
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instituting a voucher system for the consumption of legislative and
judicial services. 22 Anchored in the theoretical discussion that un-
folded here, it is possible to call for a gradual progression of the
legal system towards the private end of the spectrum and for the
removal of the artificial impediments currently blocking the way to
private supply of legislative and judicial services.
local systems will be able to offer legal baskets that are distinct from those offered by
neighboring local authorities. As a rule, the greater the extent of social behavior ordering
executed on the local plane, rather than in the state sphere, the lower the costs of moving
between legal authorities, and the greater the individual's ability to influence (by way of
exit) the legal world under which he operates. This model represents the application to the
legal sphere of Tiebout's model for supplying public goods. See Tiebout, supra note 17.
221. In this context, consider the school vouchers suggested by Milton Friedman, MIL-
TON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-107 (1962), and the protection vouchers
proposed by Nozick, NOZICK, supra note 166, at 26-27.
